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INTRODUCTION

N 1995, this law review sponsored a symposium entitled The Sentencing
Controversy: Punishment and Policy in the War Against Drugs.I That symposium's focus on sentencing was appropriate because, as one of the participants noted, "[slentencing is the bottom line of the criminal justice
system." 2 Six years later, as this current symposium makes clear, we are
still waging "war" on drugs. And although this symposium is not devoted
exclusively to punishment, sentencing is still a central-and vexing- battlefield in that war.
* Associate Professor, St. John's University School of Law; Fellow, Vincentian
Center for Church and Society. I owe thanks to the participants in the faculty
writing workshop at St. John's University School of Law for helpful comments on
an earlier version of this Article, and to Eon Smith and Brian Tretter for research
assistance. My views about cooperators and the drug war are no doubt affected by
my experiences as a soldier in that war. From 1995 through 1998, I was an
Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York, where,
among other things, I prosecuted narcotics cases.
1. Symposium, The Sentencing Controversy: Punishment and Policy in the War
Against Drugs, 40 VILL. L. REv. 301 (1995).
2. Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition,Politics and Reform, 40 VILL. L. REv. 383, 383 (1995).

(921)
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The war on drugs is fought on multiple fronts: education, treatment,
interdiction, diplomacy and law enforcement. 3 Law enforcement, however, remains the most visible front in the war-and the one with the most
significant practical impact. Each year, over 1.5 million people are arrested for drug offenses. 4 The challenge for drug war policy-makers is
what to do with those offenders. In other words, how should they be sentenced? Sentencing is the "bottom-line" in the war on drugs, and for hundreds of thousands of defendants each year, that bottom-line means
5
prison.
Our enthusiasm for incarceration as a weapon in the war on drugs is,
by now, an old story. At the federal level, stiff prison sentences for participants in the drug trade have been the norm for twenty-five years. Federal
drug sentences are determined by the federal Sentencing Guidelines (a
rigid set of sentencing rules designed to ensure that sentences are uniform) 6 and by statutory minimum penalties (an even more rigid set of
sentencing rules designed to ensure that drug sentences are severe). 7 And
despite frequent criticism of these drug sentences, 8 drug war policy-mak3. See OFFICE OF

NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, THE NATIONAL DRUG CON-

ANNUAL REPORT 6-7 (2001) (listing five "goals" of National
Drug Control Strategy as: (1) "[e] ducate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco;" (2) "[i]ncrease the safety of America's
citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence;" (3) "[r]educe
heath and social costs to the public of illegal drug use by reducing the treatment
gap;" (4) "[s]hield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat;"
and (5) "[b]reak foreign and domestic drug sources of supply").
4. See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2000 352 tbl. 4.1 (1,532,200 persons arrested nationwide for drug abuse violations in 1999).
5. See id. at 456 tbl. 5.40, 458 tbl. 5.43 (in 1996, 347,774 persons were convicted of drug felonies in state courts and 72% of those convicted were incarcerated).
TROL STRATEGY:

2001

6. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] (2000).

The federal Sentencing Guidelines were born in 1984 and took effect in 1987. See
infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' mandatory minimum drug sentences as incorporated into Guidelines).
7. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2001). The federal mandatory minimum prison
sentences were enacted in 1986. See infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text (discussing Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and creation of mandatory minimum drug
sentences). Some states had enacted harsh statutory minimum sentences even earlier. See, e.g., PAMALA L. GRISET, DETERMINATE SENTENCING: THE PROMISE AND THE
REALITY OF RETRIBUTIVEJUSTICE 61-68 (1991) (summarizing enactment, in 1973, of
New York's "Rockefeller Drug Laws," which established mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentences for many drug offenses).
8. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 199, 200 (1993) (arguing that "the alleged ill effects of mandatories
are on the whole well-established and irrefutable, while the benefits of mandatories are both smaller than expected and almost entirely achievable by other
means"). Even the most vocal supporters of the Guidelines system are critical of
mandatory drug sentences. See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, III, Fearof Law: Thoughts on
Fear of judging and the State of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J.
299, 336 (2000) (arguing that "the narcotics sentences generated by the Guidelines and the various minimum mandatory statutory sentencing provisions are
often, if not always, too high"); Stephen Breyer, Justice Breyer: Federal Sentencing
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ers remain devoted to incarceration. 9 Politicians fight to see who can be
"tougher" on crime,'(' and in the war on drugs, being tough means sending more and more drug dealers to prison for longer and longer terms.
Even in the face of promising alternatives, IIthe federal drug war in partic2
ular remains obsessed with stiff prison sentences.'
Ironically, prosecutors-the front-line soldiers wielding the weapon
of incarceration-may be less devoted to stiff prison sentences than the
policy-makers in Washington. Indeed, in many federal prosecutors' offices, uniformity (at least the kind of uniformity envisioned by the federal
Sentencing Guidelines) is a myth. In some federal districts, the drug defendant who is given the sentence mandated by the Guidelines is the exception rather than the rule.
This Article will first summarize the extent to which drug sentences
fall below the mandatory minimums established by statute and outside the
Guidelines Revisited, 14 CRIM. JusT. 28, 31-34 (1999) (criticizing mandatory minimum sentences); Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States
Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and
Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 191-94 (1993) (questioning
effectiveness of mandatory minimum sentences). Indeed, it is hard to find defenders of mandatory sentences. In a 1991 report to Congress, the Sentencing Commission reported the results of a survey it had conducted of federal judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys and probation officers who work with mandatory
minimum sentences. The overwhelming impression of these criminal justice professionals was that the mandatory minimum sentences were "too harsh." See
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 57

(1991). Even among prosecutors-the only group to voice much support for
mandatory minimums- almost two-thirds of the respondents reported unfavorable comments. See id. at 56-64. For one defense of mandatory minimums, see
Debate: Mandatory Minimums in Drug Sentencing: A Valuable Weapon in the War on
Drugs or a Handcuff on JudicialDiscretion? Judge Stanley Sporken v. Congressman Asa
Hutchinson, 36 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 1279, 1297-98 (1999) (comments of member of
Congress arguing that mandatory minimums are effective in reducing crime).
9. See Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The IncarcerationAddiction, 40 VILL. L. REv. 335, 345 (1995) (stating that "Congress wanted to send a
message across the country that the war on drugs is on, and that it will be won
because drug offenders will either be imprisoned or executed") (internal quotations omitted). The most obvious indication of Congress' reluctance to change its
approach is the continued existence of the infamous 100:1 ratio between crack
sentences and cocaine sentences. Despite a nearly complete consensus among
criminal justice professionals, the Sentencing Commission and the Department of
Justice that the 100:1 ratio is indefensible, Congress has repeatedly failed to do
anything about it. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY

1-2 (1997).

10. See MARC MAUER, THE RACE TO INCARCERATE: THE SENTENCING PROJECT 42-

80 (1999) (describing rise and triumph of "tough on crime" movement); Spencer,
supra note 9, at 338 ("For politicians and legislators, being tough on crime is indispensable to survival.").
11. See generally Douglas B. Marlowe, Effective Strategiesfor Intervening with Drug
Abusing Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REv. 989 (2002).
12. See Graham Boyd, CollateralDamage in the War on Drugs, 47 VILL. L. REv.
839, 839 (2002) (discussing harsh prison sentences for drug crimes, especially for
low-level nonviolent offenses).
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ranges established by the Sentencing Guidelines. My argument from
these statistics will be two-fold. First, the disparity in federal drug
sentences (both within districts and across districts) demonstrates the dysfunctional nature of the federal drug sentencing system. Second, and
somewhat inconsistently, I will argue for more disparity. In particular, I will
argue that-at least until Congress fixes the dysfunctional system of
mandatory minimums and related Guidelinesfederal prosecutors
should give more defendants the opportunity to receive a reduced sentence by cooperating with the authorities.
Sentence reductions for cooperators have been much criticized, often
with good reason. 13 Indeed, cooperation has been so much criticized that
my proposal for more cooperation may sound Swiftian. It is not. In our
current war on drugs, cooperation is one of the most viable ways for prosecutors to ameliorate the rigidity and severity of the mandated drug
sentences. There are, of course, better ways to fix drug sentences. Most
obviously, Congress could eliminate the mandatory minimums and the
Sentencing Commission could lower the sentencing ranges for drug offenses. But neither of those reforms is on the political horizon, and
neither is within the control of the front-line actors charged with enforcing the drug laws. There are also other ways for prosecutors to ameliorate
harsh sentences, such as charge bargaining and fact bargaining. But these
methods manipulate the defendant's sentence in a way that is surreptitious, if not dishonest. Cooperation reductions, on the other hand, are
visible, lawful and true to the prosecutor's mission in the drug war. Moreover, increasing cooperation may actually help lessen some of the
problems associated with the practice-particularly the problems of cooperator perjury and the disparity between cooperators and noncooperators.
The rest of this Article proceeds in two parts. Part II describes how
statutory minimums and the federal Sentencing Guidelines fuel the drive
to incarcerate drug offenders. 14 That part also describes the differing
ways in which prosecutors use sentencing discounts for cooperators, and
the ways in which those discounts undercut the principles of uniformity

13. See generally Keri A. Gould, Turning Rat and Doing Time for Uncharged, Dismissed, or Acquitted Crimes: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Promote Respect for the
Law?, 10 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 835 (1993); George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale:
The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 1 (2000); Cynthia Kwei
Yung Lee, ProsecutorialDiscretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. Rhv. 105 (1994); Philip Oliss, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1851
(1995); Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar Screens: Have the Sentencing Guidelines Eliminated Disparity? One Judge's Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. RhEv. 1027 (1997);
Schulhofer, supra note 8, at 211-12; Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches,
47 BUFF. L. REv. 563 (1999).

14. See infra notes 17-52 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory minimum drug sentences).
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15
Part III arand severity that are supposed to animate drug sentences.
gues for more cooperation-as a way to fight crime, as a way to reduce
cooperator perjury, as a way to reduce troubling disparities and as a way to
16
lessen drug sentences.

THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, MANDATORY MINIMUMS AND THE

II.

WAR ON DRUGS

A.

The Demise of Rehabilitation and the Birth of the War on Drugs

The political history behind the creation of the Sentencing Guidelines is a well-told tale.' 7 For most of the last century, the primary objective of federal sentencing was to rehabilitate the offender through an
individualized sentence.' 8 In federal court, this individualized sentencing
was accomplished through an "indeterminate" system in which judges had
broad discretion in selecting the defendant's sentence and the Parole
Commission had the ultimate say over how much time the defendant actually spent in prison. 19 The theory was that judges and parole officers
could fashion a sentence tailored to an individual offender's need for rehabilitative "treatment."20 In trying to fashion an individualized sentence,
judges frequently focused on those factors that made the offender an individual: criminal history, age, education, employment, family background,
family responsibilities, charitable works, health, history of substance abuse,
remorse and any other facbehavior at trial, assistance to the authorities,
21
relevant.
considered
judge
the
that
tor
15. See infra notes 53-127 and accompanying text (analyzing effects of departures from mandatory minimum drug sentences).
16. See infra notes 128-49 and accompanying text (arguing in favor of cooperation in exchange for reduced sentence).
17. For the most comprehensive description of the legislative history of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Sentencing Guidelines, see generally Kate
Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993). See also KATE
STITH

& Jost A.

CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FED-

ERAL COURTS 38-77

(1998).

18. See Williams v. NewYork, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (referring to "[t]oday's
philosophy of individualizing sentences"); FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE
REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 12-31 (1981) (discussing rise and fall of rehabilitation as theoretical justification for punishment).

19. See Williams, 337 U.S. at 248-49 (reflecting role of indeterminate sentences
in increase in discretionary powers exercised in fixing punishment).
20. See Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for this Age of FederalSentencing: The
Opportunity and Need forJudicialLawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 94 (1999);
Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in
Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 679, 686-88.

21. See Williams, 337 U.S. at 247 (noting that sentencing judge could consider
"the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics"); MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAw WITHOUT ORDER 7-8, 18-25

(1973) (discussing factors considered by judges in setting sentences); STANTON
WHEELER, KENNETH MANN & AUSTIN SARAT, SITrING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING
(1988). Such cases abound. See, e.g.,
OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS

88-92, 102-105
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By the 1970s, this system had come under increasing attack from sentencing reformers who argued that indeterminate sentencing was fundamentally unjust. The culprit, in the minds of most sentencing reformers,
was judicial discretion. 22 Sentencing reformers argued that unfettered judicial discretion led to indefensible disparities among similarly-situated offenders. 23 Because judges' sentencing decisions were neither guided nor
reviewed, different judges could impose vastly different sentences for the
24
same offense.
By way of illustration, imagine two co-defendants, Mutt and Jeff, who
committed an armed bank robbery together. Assume that Mutt and Jeff
were childhood friends, with similar backgrounds and identical criminal
records. The only difference between the two is that Mutt was sentenced
by Judge Lenient, while Jeff was sentenced by Judge Harsh. Under preGuidelines law, it would have been perfectly legal for Mutt to receive a
sentence of one day in prison, while Jeff was sentenced to twenty-five years
in prison. 2 5 Similarly, even if Mutt and Jeff were sentenced by the same
judge, nothing required the judge to give the two men similar sentences.
So, for example, the judge could have given Jeff a harsher sentence for no
United States v. Hernandez, 617 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that codefendant was given leniency because of his age (25), remorse and drug addiction); United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (considering, among other things, defendant's lack of criminal history, age, health,
employment and charitable works).
22. By far the most influential critic ofjudicial discretion and indeterminate
sentencing was Judge Marvin Frankel. See FRANKEL, supra note 21, at 5 ("[T]he
almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning
of sentences are terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to
the rule of law."); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 35 (discussing Frankel's influence on sentencing reform); Berman, supra note 20, at 94-95 (same).
Although reformers also criticized the discretion exercised by parole boards, see,
e.g.,
GRISET, supra note 7, at 36-37, the main focus of sentencing reformers was the
discretion exercised by sentencing judges. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at
31.

23. See Bowman, supra note 20, at 686-88 (discussing criticisms of indeterminate sentencing).
24. Empirical and anecdotal evidence in the 1970s strongly suggested that
inter-judge disparity was rampant. See Berman, supra note 20, at 95; see also Ilene
H. Nagel, StructuringSentencing Discretion: The New FederalSentencing Guidelines,80 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 895-97 (1990) (discussing empirical studies from

1970s and 1980s showing widespread disparity in pre-Guidelines sentencing). But
see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 105-12 (criticizing empirical studies and
arguing that "[ifnter-judge sentence variation was not as rampant or as 'shameful'
in the federal courts under the pre-Guidelines regime as Congress apparently believed when it enacted the Sentencing Reform Act in 1984").
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (2001) (fixing sentence for armed bank robbery
at "not more than twenty-five years"). As Judge Frankel described it:
[F]ederal trial judges, answerable only to their varieties of consciences,
may and do send people to prison for terms that may vary in any given
case from none at all up to five, ten, thirty, or more years. This means in
the great majority of federal criminal cases that a defendant who comes
up for sentencing has no way of knowing or reliably predicting whether
he will walk out of the courtroom on probation, or be locked up for a
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better reason than that the judge did not like tall people. 26 And while
height may not have often entered into pre-Guidelines sentencing decisions, it was possible-and some argued likely-that a defendant's race,
ethnicity or socio-economic status influenced (consciously or uncon27
sciously) many judicial evaluations of rehabilitative potential.
The attack on the perceived inequities caused by judicial discretion
found a ready audience in the 1970s and 1980s. In the psychological community, the theoretical justification for indeterminate sentencing-rehabilitation-was collapsing. 2 8 Empirical studies in the 1970s began to
suggest that penal rehabilitation simply did not work, 29 leading to "massive professional and academic disillusionment with the therapeutic
term of years that may consume the rest of his life, or something in
between.
FRNKEL, supra note 21, at 6.
26. See Bowman, supra note 20, at 686 ("Judges were free to give different
sentences based on factors as whimsical as dress or hairstyle or a 'gut feeling' that
this defendant was good and that one was bad, so long as the judges were not
impolitic enough to put the more extreme of such subjective assessments on the
record.").

27. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 21, at 23 ("[T]here is broad latitude in our
sentencing laws for kinds of class bias that are commonly known, never explicitly
acknowledged, and at war with the superficial neutrality of the statute as literally
written."); Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining
Nearly a Decade of DecliningFederalDrug Sentences, 86 IowA L. REv. 1043, 1059 (2001)
(noting that liberal sentencing reformers were motivated by desire to eliminate
"the specter of unjust, perhaps racially discriminatory, disparities in punishment
produced by the unfettered exercise of judicial sentencing discretion"); David A.
Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1283, 1302 (1995)
("[O]ne of the strongest arguments raised against the broad sentencing discretion
entrusted . . . [before the Guidelines] to federal judges was the danger that
sentences set arbitrarily would be influenced by race."). But see STITH & CABRANES,

supra note 17, at 107 (arguing that, according to one study of pre-Guidelines sentencing, "'[d]ifferences clearly thought to be unwarranted (e.g., by the offender's
race or ethnicity) were found to be uniformly small or statistically insignificant'")
(quoting DOUGLAS McDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MATrER?
TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 1986-1990 25 (1993)).

THE TRANSITION

28. See ALLEN, supra note 18; STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 29-35.
29. See DOUGLAS LIPTON, ROBERT MARTINSON & JUDITH WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES

627 (1975) (examining over two hundred correctional rehabilitation programs
and concluding that "the field of corrections has not as yet found satisfactory ways
to reduce recidivism by significant amounts"); Robert Martinson, What Works?Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22, 25 (1974) ("With
few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so
far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism") (emphasis omitted); see also
GRISET, supra note 7, at 28-29 ("The Martinson study was strong ammunition for

the emerging anti-rehabilitationists, as disillusionment with the impact of rehabilitation on recidivism prompted a 'nothing works' refrain."); STITH & CABRANES,
supra note 17, at 35 ("Martinson's widely circulated views seemed to be the death
knell for an indeterminate sentencing system based on rehabilitative goals ....").
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model." 30 Even more important, political support for indeterminate sentencing was evaporating. As crime rates rose throughout the 1970s and
early 1980s, the public began to blame the sentencing system. 31 Judges
who focused on rehabilitation were seen as "soft on crime" while indeter32
minate sentences were seen as dishonest and, to put it bluntly, too short.
Of particular concern throughout the 1970s and 1980s was a fear of
rising drug abuse and drug-related crime. In the 1970s, the public feared
the inner city heroin addict and the attendant property crimes committed
to finance that addiction. 33 By the 1980s, however, the "popular image of
the menacing drug addict" was no longer the "heroin-using 'junkie'" but
rather the "cocaine-using 'crack-head."' 34 And the attendant crime feared
by the public was no longer property crime, but violent crime. As "driveby shooting" entered the popular lexicon, 35 the public came to see drug
abuse as not simply a crime that destroyed the lives of users, but as a crime
that threatened the lives of innocent bystanders.3 6 Importantly, the mid1980s also saw "widespread fear" that drug abuse-particularly crack usewas "expanding beyond the ghetto into suburbia." 37 As one scholar ob30. Steven S. Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64 MINN. L. REv. 669, 685-86
(1980).
31. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 31; Barbara S. Barrett, Sentencing
Guidelines: Recommendationsfor Sentencing Reform, 57 Mo. L. REv. 1077, 1079 (1992)

(discussing effect on sentencing reform of public perception that crime rates were
"out of control" in 1970s); Bowman, supra note 20, at 688-89.
32. See Bowman, supra note 20, at 688 ("[O]bservers had the sense that lazy
prosecutors were indiscriminately plea bargaining away cases against vicious
criminals to reduce their workloads, and that soft judges were letting criminals get
away with minimal sentences."); Stith & Koh, supra note 17, at 227 (discussing preGuidelines system and noting that "critics from the political right expressed dissatisfaction with the perceived leniency of sentencing judges and parole officials").
33. See Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 37
(noting that in 1970s "New York was widely portrayed as suffering a heroin 'epidemic,' which was followed in the 1980s by successive cocaine and crack epidemics
in various parts of the country") (citing DAVID MusTo, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 244-77 (1987)).

34. Sklansky, supra note 27, at 1291 (quoting MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, AGAINST
EXCESS: DRUG POLICY FOR RESULTS 299 (1992)).

35. See, e.g., Berkeley Police Link Drugs to Four Drive-By Shootings, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 9, 1985, at 2 (discussing "a rash of shootings from cars, apparently drug related" that had struck California city).
36. See Sterling, supra note 2, at 398 (noting that in mid-1980s, members of
Congress, in talking about "drug war," would refer to "America's streets" as "riddled by drug-related violence").
37. Sklansky, supra note 27, at 1293; see also United States v. Clary, 846 F.
Supp. 768, 778 (E.D. Mo. 1994) rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Most important
of all, those parts of a neighborhood believed to be immune to the spread of crime
now found that the plague was spreading, first to the edges of the inner cities and
then to the affluent suburbs and even to the distant rural towns and villages.").
Sklansky convincingly argues that the fear of rising drug crime was essentially racebased. Crack was seen as "'a black drug, sold by black men'" and "much of the
public anxiety about the feared narcotic stemmed from a concern that use of the
drug was spreading beyond the confines of the minority group with which it traditionally had been associated." Sklansky, supra note 27, at 1292-94; see also Sterling,
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served, during the 1980s "drug abuse was transformed in the public mind
from a social problem of moderate importance to a national crisis of the
38
first order."
Congress responded in two ways. First, it moved to restrict judicial
discretion in all federal sentences through sentencing guidelines. By the
1980s, sentencing reformers had put together an unlikely political coalition. Reformers on the left were eager to restrict judicial discretion to
ensure that sentencing decisions were not discriminatory- racially, ethnically or economically. Reformers on the right were eager to restrict judicial discretion to ensure that sentences were not too lenient.3 9 The result
was the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which eliminated parole, established the Sentencing Commission and charged the Commission with writ40
ing sentencing guidelines that would bind federal judges.
Second, Congress greatly increased the penalties for drug trafficking.
Spurred on by public fears of rising drug abuse and drug-related crime (as
well as by an approaching election), Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986,41 which inaugurated our current regime of mandatory minimum drug sentences. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, judges
could sentence drug offenders to long prison terms, short prison terms or
probation, as the judge saw fit.4 2 The 1986 Act, however, established minisupranote 2, at 391-95 (discussing how "cynical exploitation of racial fear and hatred became a central legislative strategy in the enactment of narcotics prohibition" throughout 1990s).
38. Sklansky, supra note 27, at 1286. The death of college basketball star Len
Bias in June 1986 from a cocaine overdose heightened public fears that the "drug
problem" was out of control. Though Bias was black, he did not fit the public
image of a drug addict: he was an All-American athlete who had just signed a
lucrative contract with the Boston Celtics. As Sklansky argues, "for most white
Americans, what [Bias' death] dramatized was not that drug abuse posed special
threats for minority communities, but that drug abuse threatened everyone." Id. at
1295; see also Sterling, supra note 2, at 391-95; Roy S. Johnson, All-America Basketball
Star, Celtic Choice, Dies Suddenly, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1986, at Al.
39. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 47 (noting that "large and unusual
alliance" supporting mandatory sentencing guidelines "included House and Senate Republicans, President Reagan, Senator Kennedy, Senator Biden, and liberal

sentencing reform advocates"); Bowman & Heise, supra note 27, at 1059.
40. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 51-59; Bowman, supra note 20, at
690-92.

41. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 110 Stat. 3207 (Oct. 27, 1986) (codified as amended
in 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-969). Like most "comprehensive" crime bills, the 1986 Act was
passed in October of a national election year. See Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial
Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 902-07 (2000) (summarizing history of federal criminal law and
noting that since 1984 every national election year has seen significant federal
criminal legislation); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE

SYSTEM 9 (1991) ("Beginning in 1984, and every two years thereafter, Congress
enacted an array of mandatory minimum penalties specifically targeted at drugs
and violent crime.").
42. See Spencer, supra note 9, at 343. Although Congress had established
mandatory minimum penalties for many drug offenses in the 1950s, see Narcotic

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 8

930

Vii.iANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47: p. 921

mum penalties for offenses involving certain quantities of drugs. In 1988,
Congress stiffened those minimum penalties.4 3 Thus, offenders convicted
of distributing 100 grams of heroin, 500 grams of cocaine or five grams of
crack now face a mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment.44 Offenders convicted of distributing 1000 grams of heroin, 5000
grams of cocaine or fifty grams of crack now face a mandatory minimum
sentence of ten years imprisonment. 45 For second offenders, those mini46
mum sentences can be doubled.
The impact of these mandatory minimum sentences was magnified
when the Sentencing Guidelines went into effect in 1987. Although the
Sentencing Guidelines were intended to fundamentally change the way in
which sentences were determined, they were not generally intended to
change sentence severity. Thus, with a few exceptions, sentence severity
47
under the Guidelines was designed to reflect pre-Guidelines' practice.
For drug offenses, however, pre-Guidelines' sentencing practice had been
fundamentally altered by the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act. So when the Sentencing Commission drafted the guidelines for drug offenses, it used the
new mandatory minimum sentences as starting points. 48 As a result,

Control Act of 1956, ch. 629, 70 STAT. 567 (1956), those minimum penalties were
eliminated in 1970 for all drug offenses except those involving continuing criminal
enterprises, see Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236. See also Spencer, supra note 9, at 343 n.48.

43. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (Nov.
18, 1988) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-969).
44. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B) (2001).
45. See id. § 841(b)(1)(A).
46. See id. § 841(b). Under 21 U.S.C. § 851 (2001), the doubled mandatory
minimum sentences for second offenders are triggered only if the prosecutor
elects to file what is called a "prior felony information"-a decision that is wholly
within the prosecutor's discretion.
47. See U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A(3) (2000) (describing how Sentencing Commission used "an empirical approach that used as a starting point data estimating preguidelines sentencing practice"); Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFsTRA L. REv. 1, 7 (1988) ("[I]n
creating categories and determining sentence lengths, the Commission, by and
large, followed typical past practice"). One exception to this past practice approach was the Commission's conscious choice to increase sentence severity for
white-collar offenses. See Breyer, supra, at 20-21 (discussing Commission's "decision to increase the severity of punishment for white-collar crime" by requiring
imprisonment "for many white-collar offenders, including tax, insider trading, and
antitrust offenders, who previously would have likely received only probation");
U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A(3) (noting Commission's conclusion that economic crime in
pre-Guidelines era had been "punished less severely than other apparently
equivalent behavior"). The Commission also chose to increase sentences for some
violent crimes. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 60-61; Breyer, supra, at 19.
48. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 60 & n.155 ("[W]herever Congress had enacted a mandatory minimum sentence, as it already had done for drug
dealing and as it would do with increasing frequency throughout the 1980s, the
Commission developed Guidelines that require sentences substantially above the
statutory minimum in most cases."); U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A(3) (noting that "increased and mandatory minimum sentences" of Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 re-
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Guidelines sentences for drug offenses are determined largely by the
quantity of the drug involved, and those sentences are directly propor49
tional to the mandatory minimum sentences established by Congress.
The practical effect of these sentence reforms-at least on our prisons 5 0-has been striking. Since 1986, the average federal drug sentence
has more than doubled,51 and the number of federal prisoners incarcerated for drug offenses has grown by more than 400%.52

B.

The Sentencing Guidelines and Departures:An Overview

Since the Sentencing Guidelines went into effect in 1987, sentences
have been determined by reference to the infamous "sentencing grid,"
which establishes over 250 separate sentencing ranges. 53 No longer are
sentences individualized. Instead, a defendant's sentencing range is determined by combining a mathematical score for the seriousness of the of54
fense with a mathematical score for the defendant's criminal history.
The resulting process, as intended, significantly restricts judicial discretion. 55 Most obviously, the factors that determine the seriousness of
the offense (such as the amount of money stolen, the extent of the physiquired Commission to depart from its normal practice of drafting Guidelines to
reflect pre-Guidelines practice).
49. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (c) & cmt. Background ("The base offense levels [for
drug trafficking] are either provided directly by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
or are proportional to the levels established by statute ...

."); see also Bowman &

Heise, supra note 27, at 1060-62 (describing impact on Sentencing Guidelines of
1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act).

50. Whether these harsher drug sentences have had other practical effects,
such as reducing drug abuse, reducing drug trafficking or reducing violent crime,
is something about which debate continues to rage. Compare William H. Ryan, Jr.,
Fighting the War on Drugs in the Twenty-First Century: A Prosecutor'sPerspective,47 VILL.
L. REV. 809 (2002) (stating that drug sentences have reduced drug trafficking and
violent crime), with Graham Boyd, CollateralDamage in the War on Drugs, 47 VILL. L.
REV. 839 (2002) (asserting that drug sentences are unnecessarily harsh and have
resulted in repression of African-Americans).
51. In 1986, before the Sentencing Guidelines went into effect, the average
amount of time actually spent in prison by drug offenders was thirty months. See
JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: FEDERAL DRUG OFFENDERS, 1999 WITH TRENDS 1984-99, at 1 (2001). In 1999, the average amount of

time actually spent in prison by drug offenders was sixty-six months. See id.
52. In 1986, 14,976 prisoners were incarcerated for federal drug offenses. See
id. at 7. By 1999, that figure had risen to over 68,360. See id. According to the

Federal Bureau of Prisons, 75,625 prisoners were incarcerated for drug offenses as
of October 2001. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, QUICK FACTS, OCTOBER 2001,
available at http://www.bop.gov/fact0598.html.

53. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A.
54. For a good introduction to how the Guidelines

work, see Bowman, supra
note 20, at 690-705; see also Breyer, supra note 47, at 6-31 (1988).
55. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Places in the Heartland:DepartureJurisprudenceAfter

Koon, 9

FED. SENT. REP. 19, 19 (1996) ("The whole point of the guidelines was to
hem in district courts with a set of rules created by the Commission and enforced

by courts of appeals."); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 78-103 (criticizing Guidelines for restricting judicial discretion).
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cal injury inflicted or the quantity of drugs distributed) and the factors
that determine the blameworthiness of the offender (such as the defendant's role in the offense or abuse of a position of trust) have been spelled
out by the Sentencing Commission in minute detail.56 Notably, many of
the individual offender characteristics that often played a central role in
pre-Guidelines sentencing have no effect on the mathematical calculation. 57 Moreover, to the extent that judges retain discretion to decide
where, within a particular guideline range, the defendant should be sentenced, 58 the ranges in the Guidelines grid are exceedingly narrow-at
59
least when compared to pre-Guidelines law.
Notwithstanding the Guidelines' seemingly rigid commitment to uniformity, judges are given limited authority to "depart" from the narrow
ranges set by the Guidelines. 60 First, the sentencing judge may depart if
the Guidelines specifically encourage such a departure. 61 Second, the
judge may depart if something about the offense or the offender takes the
case out of the "heartland" envisioned by the Commission. 62 A "heartland" departure may be appropriate if the judge finds "an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
56. By 2000, the Guidelines had grown to over 400 pages of guidelines, policy
statements and commentary. See U.S.S.G. ch.5, pt. A.
57. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1-12 (describing age, education and vocational skills,
mental and emotional conditions, physical condition, employment record, family
ties and responsibilities, military, civic, charitable and public service and prior
good works as "not ordinarily relevant").
58. Judges are still free to consider most individual sentencing factors in deciding what sentence to impose within the relatively narrow Guidelines sentencing
range. See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.1(a) ("A sentence conforms with the guidelines for imprisonment if it is within the minimum and maximum terms of the applicable
guideline range.").
59. Most federal criminal statutes provide only a maximum sentence, so the
statutory range is almost always a term of many years. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d)
(2001) (sentence for armed bank robbery is "not more than twenty-five years"); 18
U.S.C. § 201 (2001) (sentence for bribing public official is "not more than fifteen
years"). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, by contrast, mandated that the minimum of any Guidelines sentencing range not exceed the maximum by more than
25% or six months. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2001); U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A(4)(h).
Thus, the armed bank robber who faced a pre-Guidelines sentence of between
zero and 300 months would face a Guidelines sentence of between seventy and
eighty-seven months. See id. § 2B3.1. Similarly, the defendant who paid a $10,000
bribe to a judge and faced a pre-Guidelines sentence between zero and 180
months would now face a Guidelines sentencing of between twenty-seven and
thirty-three months. See id. § 2C3.1.
60. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 109 (1996).
61. Id. at 96.
62. Id. at 92-93; U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, 4(b) ("The Commission intends the
sentencing courts to treat each guideline as carving out a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes. When a court
finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but
where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether
a departure is warranted.").
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guidelines... "63 Alternatively, a "heartland" departure may be appropriate if the judge finds a sentencing factor that the Commission has deemed
"not ordinarily relevant" that is present to an "exceptional" degree. 64
Within this framework, the Guidelines more or less accomplish their
stated purpose of ensuring that defendants with similar criminal records
who commit similar offenses receive similar sentences. Nevertheless, this
system has one major loophole: the departure for "substantial assistance-the cooperator's departure. Section 5K1.1 of the Guidelines provides that a court "may depart" from the sentence mandated by the
Guidelines grid "[u] pon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution
65
of another person."
Substantial assistance departures differ from most other departures in
several important ways. First, because substantial assistance departures are
"encouraged," 66 the sentencing court need not make the threshold legal
finding necessary for a heartland departure-that is, that a particular aggravating or mitigating factor was not adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission. 67 This distinction is important because the
Sentencing Commission expressed its view early on that heartland depar-

63. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994); U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b); see also Koon, 518

U.S. at 92.
64. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0; see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 95-96.
65. See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. The "substantial assistance" departure was created in
response to a congressional directive in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: "The
Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of
imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed, including a sentence
that is lower than that established by statute as a minimum sentence, to take into
account a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense." 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1984). Although Congress did not direct the Sentencing Commission to condition substantial assistance departures on a government motion, Congress had imposed the
government motion requirement in the analogous provision that allows cooperators to receive sentences below the statutory minimum. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)
(1994).
66. Although "substantial assistance" is not the only encouraged departure,
most other encouraged departures are upward departures. See, e.g., U.S.S.G.
§§ 5K2.1 (death), 5K2.2 (physical injury), 5K2.3 (extreme psychological injury),
5K2.4 (abduction or unlawful restraint), 5K2.5 (property damage or loss), 5K2.6
(weapons and dangerous instrumentalities), 5K2.7 (disruption of government
function), 5K2.8 (extreme conduct), 5K2.14 (public welfare), 5K2.17 (high capacity, semi-automatic firearms), 5K2.18 (violent street gangs), 5K2.21 (dismissed and

uncharged conduct). Notwithstanding the number of these encouraged departures, upward departures are imposed in fewer than 1% of all Guidelines
sentences. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF SENTENCING STATISTICS fig. G [hereinafter 2000 SOURCEBOOK].
67. See supra notes 63 and 66 and accompanying text (discussing how "heartland" departures differ from "substantial assistance" departures).
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tures will be "highly infrequent" 68 and "extremely rare," 6 9 and many
70
Seccourts of appeals have been reluctant to approve such departures.
ond, whether a defendant is eligible for a substantial assistance departure
is almost completely discretionary-and that discretion rests entirely with
the prosecution. With all other departures (both encouraged departures
and heartland departures) the judge must first make independent findings that the defendant is eligible for the departure. 7 1 With cooperation
departures, however, it is the prosecutor who decides whether the defendant has provided "substantial assistance," and the prosecutor's decision is
effectively unreviewable. 72 Third, the judge's decision about the extent of
a substantial assistance departure is neither constrained by the Guidelines

68. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A(4) (b) (explaining Commission's view that Guidelines
already take into account relevant sentencing factors); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 96
(noting that Commission anticipated infrequent departures for grounds not in
Guidelines).
69. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, comment.
70. See Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and PurposefulDepartures:FixingaJurisprudence that Undermines the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.21, 5455 (2000) (noting that while some circuit courts-notably the Second, Third and
Ninth Circuits- construed departure authority broadly, decisions from other cir-

cuit courts "suggested that the Commission's 'heartlands' were large and left little
room for departures"). In the early years of the Guidelines, non-cooperation
downward departures were given in fewer than 10% of all cases. See UNITED STATES
COMMISSION, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
fig. G [hereinafter 1996 SOURCEBOOK]. After Koon was decided in 1996, some
courts began to take a more expansive view of departure authority, see Berman,
supra, at 80-84 (noting that Koon has increased departures in circuits that already
favored departures), and such departures have gradually increased, rising to 17%
by 2000, see 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 66, at fig. G. Yet, many courts still construe their departure authority very narrowly. See Berman, supra, at 80-84 (discussing studies showing that Koon had little impact on departures in those circuits that
generally took more restrictive view of departure authority).
71. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98 ("Before a departure is permitted, certain aspects
of the case must be found unusual enough for it to fall outside the heartland of
cases in the Guideline. To resolve this question, the district court must make a
refined assessment of the many facts bearing on the outcome.... ."). For example,
although the Guidelines dictate that a defendant's "family circumstances" are "not
ordinarily relevant" in making a departure decision, see U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6, a court
may nevertheless depart from the Guidelines if a defendant's family circumstances
are extraordinary, see United States v. Galante, 111 F.3d 1029, 1036-37 (2d Cir.
1997). Before making such a departure, the sentencing judge must find such extraordinary circumstances-a finding that is subject to appellate review. Compare
Galante, 111 F.3d at 1036-37 (upholding family circumstances departure), with
United States v. Dyce, 91 F.3d 1466, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (reversing departure
because appellate court disagreed with district court's finding that defendant's
family circumstances were extraordinary).
72. See Wade v. United States, 504 US. 181, 187 (1992) (upholding government motion requirement in U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1, while noting that government may
move (or not move) for substantial assistance departure based on its "rational assessment of the cost and benefit that would flow from moving"). See generally Lee,
supra note 13 (criticizing § 5Kl.1's government motion requirement).
SENTENCING
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nor reviewable on appeal. 7 3 Heartland departures, on the other hand, are
reviewable both for reasonableness and for consistency with other provisions of the Guidelines.7 4 Fourth, a defendant who receives a substantial
assistance departure may also receive a sentence below any statutorily mandated minimum.7 5 No other downward departure authorizes a sentence
below the statutory minimum-no matter how extraordinary the offense
76
or the offender.
The rigidity and severity of the Guidelines create powerful incentives
for defendants to cooperate. Indeed, a cooperation departure is usually
the only significant sentencing factor over which a defendant has any control, and-because the average cooperation departure cuts a defendant's
sentence in half77-it is often a defendant's only hope for a reduced sen-

tence. 78 Thus, it is not surprising that cooperation departures have fundamentally changed federal prosecutions.
There are no statistics about the frequency of cooperation in the preGuidelines era, but statistics from the earliest days of the Guidelines suggest that cooperation was rare. 79 In 1989, the first year for which the Sen73. See United States v. Khalil, 132 F.3d 897, 898 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that
appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review extent of substantial assistance
departure).

74. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 99 (adopting abuse of discretion standard for appellate review of departure decisions); Berman, supra note 70, at 75-81 (criticizing
Koon for sending inconsistent messages about appellate deference to departure
decisions).
75. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994) (providing that defendants who provide
"substantial assistance" may be sentenced to less than minimum required by stat-

ute); U.S.S.G. § 5KI.1, comment. (n.1) (2000) (stating that defendants who provide "substantial assistance" may receive sentence below statutory minimum).
76. The only other Guidelines provision that authorizes a sentence below the
statutory minimum is the "safety valve" enacted by Congress in 1994, which permits
a modest sentence reduction for the least culpable narcotics offenders. SeeViolent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (1994)). A defendant eligible for the "safety
valve" is sentenced without regard for any mandatory minimum, and so could receive (in addition to the "safety valve" reduction) a heartland departure that reduced the defendant's sentence even further below the statutory minimum. See id.
77. The Sentencing Commission began reporting the average extent of cooperation departures in 1997. Each year since then, the average sentence reduction
for a cooperator has been approximately 50%. See 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note
66, at tbl. 30; UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 30 [hereinafter 1999 SOURCEBOOK]; UNITED STATES SENTENCING

COMMISSION,

1998

SOURCEBOOK

OF SENTENCING

STATISTICS

tbl. 30

[hereinafter 1998 SOURCEBOOK]; UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1997
SOURCEBOOK OF SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 30 [hereinafter 1997 SOURCEBOOK].
78. Defendants can earn a modest sentencing reduction by "accepting responsibility" for their criminal conduct (usually by pleading guilty). See U.S.S.G.

§ 3E1.1. The resulting two- or three-point reduction in offense level pales in comparison to the three- to four-point departures possible for substantial assistance.
See id.; Weinstein, supra note 13, at 575.
79. See Weinstein, supra note 13, at 563 n.2 (noting absence of data on cooperation rates before 1989).
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tencing Commission kept statistics, only 3.5% of federal defendants
earned cooperation departures (Figure 1).80 It did not take long, however, for defendants (and defense attorneys) to realize that substantial assistance departures could be the only way out of a harsh Guidelines
sentence. 81 Prosecutors, in turn, began to realize the tremendous power
they now had to entice defendants to cooperate and the tremendous ben82
efits that cooperation could yield.
Thus, in the early years of the Guidelines, the rate at which defendants cooperated increased dramatically. By 1991, cooperation rates had
jumped to over 10%, and they climbed steadily after that: hitting 20% in
1994 and peaking at 23% in 1995. Although overall cooperation rates
have gradually declined since 1995, almost one in five federal defendants
still receives a cooperation departure.

80. See 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at fig. G (showing cooperation statistics for 1989, as determined by a 25% random sample of cases). It is likely that
cooperation was even less frequent before 1989 because, by then, the Guidelines
had already been in effect for a full year and the harsh mandatory minimum
sentences for narcotics offenses established by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
had already been in effect for two full years. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub
L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841848). In 1989, substantial assistance was the only way to avoid those mandatory
minimum sentences. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances authorizing sentence below minimum).
81. See generally Robert G. Morvillo and RobertJ. Anello, Cooperation: The Pitfalls and Obligationsfor Defense Attorneys, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 5, 2000, at 3 (noting that
Sentencing Guidelines have made cooperation more appealing to defense bar, "if
only by making the alternative that much more threatening"); Daniel C. Richman,
Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 78-84 (1995) (discussing defense attorneys'
ethical obligation to explore cooperation with their clients).
82. For a more detailed discussion of the process by which prosecutors decide
whether to "sign up" a particular cooperator, see Michael A. Simons, Retributionfor
Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REv. (forthcoming 2003)
(on file with author).
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FIGuRE 1

83

NATIONWIDE COOPERATION RATES IN ALL CASES
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As one scholar described it, there is now a "thriving market" for cooperation: defendants are the "suppliers" and their "commodity" is their co84
operation; prosecutors are the "buyers" and their currency is leniency.
Yet, not everyone cooperates. To continue the marketplace metaphor,
there are three different disincentives for cooperation. 8 5 First, some defendants do not want to produce the goods. Whether because of fear of
retaliation, loyalty to their accomplices or general antipathy to the government, some defendants simply do not want to become a "rat."8 6 Second,
83. Figure 1 shows the percentage of federal defendants who received substantial assistance departures in a particular fiscal year. The information in Figure
1 comes from Figure G of the Sentencing Commission's Annual Sourcebook of
Sentencing Statistics. The percentages from 1989 and 1990 were derived from a
25% random sample of cases. Information from 1991 through 2000 includes all

cases. See 2000

SOURCEBOOK,

supra note 66, at fig. G; 1996

SOURCEBOOK,

supra note

70, at fig. G. The percentages reflected in Figure 1 are as follows:
Nationwide Cooperation Rates in All Cases
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
3.5% 7.5% 11.9% 15.1% 16.9% 19.5% 23.0% 121.7%

1997

1998

1999

2000

19.2%

19.3%

18.7%

17.9%

84. See generally Weinstein, supra note 13.
85. See id. at 565. Weinstein's economic analysis of cooperation is detailed
and compelling. Although I have argued elsewhere that the purely utilitarian view
of cooperation is incomplete, see Simons, supra note 82, notions of supply and
demand still explain much of what goes on in cooperation.
86. See Richman, supra note 81, at 78-84 (discussing "social costs of cooperating," including disdain, ostracism and physical retaliation); Simons, supra note 82.
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some defendants cannot produce the goods, even if they want to cooperate. Because they lack both accomplices against whom they can cooperate
and serendipitous knowledge of other criminal activity, these defendants
have nothing to sell. Third, for some defendants who want to cooperate,
prosecutors are not willing to pay the price-either because the defendant
is too culpable or because the defendant's information is not valuable
87
enough.
C.

Departures in Drug Cases

In drug cases, the disincentives for cooperation are notably lessened.
On the defendant's side, there is a ready supply of cooperators in drug
cases. Many drug defendants want to cooperate (because of the severe
sentences they are facing) and most of them can cooperate (because drug
trafficking offenses, by their very nature, involve chains of accomplices,
associates and co-conspirators). 8 8 On the prosecutor's side, there is a
strong demand for cooperators. Prosecutors often need cooperators to
catch the "big fish"-the importers and traffickers who are not out on the
street corner where they can be easily seen and caught.8 °
87. See Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperationin Criminal Cases, 45 VAND.
L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1992) (describing prosecutor's decision about who should cooperate as "a difficult calculation" that must weigh moral culpability and future dangerousness of cooperator against moral culpability and future dangerousness of
target).
88. A 1997 study by Sentencing Commission staff found that defendants facing mandatory minimum drug sentences were nearly twice as likely to cooperate as
other defendants. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE STAFF WORKING GROUP, FEDERAL COURT PRACTICES: SENTENCE REDUCTIONS
SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT 156 (1997)
[hereinafter SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE STAFF WORKING GROUP REPORT]. The study
surmised that "these defendants are more willing to provide information to prosecutors in return for their only chance for a sentence reduction below the statutory
mandatory minimum." Id.
89. See Weinstein, supra note 13, at 597 (describing prosecutors' need for evidence in drug cases); Daniel Richman, CooperatingDefendants: The Costs and Benefits
of PurchasingInformationfiom Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENT. REP. 292, 293 (1996) (addressing benefits of cooperator system and noting that sentencing reductions may be
"the only way to get critical testimony"). A 1997 Sentencing Commission survey of
federal prosecutors' offices revealed the importance of cooperation departures in
drug prosecutions:
Several districts responded that substantial assistance motions are made
frequently in their districts because of the number of multi-defendant
narcotics cases prosecuted in the districts and the need to use substantial
assistance motions to dismantle large drug organizations. These districts
noted that their "ability to prosecute large narcotics cases is directly tied
to our use of substantial assistance motion practice." Several districts
noted that they have a high volume of drug conspiracy cases dependent
on co-conspirator testimony. Others noted that the high sentencing
guidelines and statutory mandatory minimums in narcotics cases, particularly drug conspiracy cases, resulted in frequent use of the substantial
assistance motions.
SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE STAFF WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 88, at 38.
BASED ON DEFENDANTS'
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Moreover, and significantly, many prosecutors are willing to pay the
price for cooperation in drug cases because drug sentences are already so
severe. In a recent survey of federal drug sentences in the 1990s, Frank
Bowman and Michael Heise noted that drug sentences have been gradually, but steadily, declining. 90 In an effort to explain the decline in drug
sentences, they examined a multitude of factors from: amendments to the
Guidelines, to changes in case law, to changes in the kinds of cases being
brought. They concluded that the declining sentences resulted not from
those factors, but rather from discretionary decisions made by prosecutors
and judges. 9' Their analysis revealed that at almost every place in the system, in which prosecutors and judges have discretion, that discretion is
exercised, on average, to ameliorate harsh drug sentences. 92 Bowman and
Heise concluded that these discretionary decisions are likely being made
by prosecutors and judges who believe that the severe sentences required
by the drug guidelines and the mandatory minimums "are often, if not
always, too high, or at the least are higher than necessary to achieve the
institutional objectives of the system's front-line actors." 93 In the context
of cooperation, that means prosecutors in drug cases will be more willing
to dole out a little leniency (in return for useful cooperation) because the
resulting sentence will still be severe enough to accomplish the usual goals
94
of sentencing: retribution and deterrence.
So it is not surprising that, as popular as cooperation is generally, it is
even more popular in drug cases. As Figure 2 shows, in 1989, when overall
cooperation rates were 3.5%, drug trafficking cooperation rates were already over 10%. By 1991, the drug trafficking cooperation rate had
reached 20%. Since then, cooperation rates in drug cases have followed

90. See Bowman & Heise, supra note 27, at 1047 (describing pattern of
decline).
91. See id. at 1101-03 (explaining which factors affect sentences). While Bowman and Heise identify some non-discretionary factors that appear to have affected sentence length in particular years (e.g., the 1995 incorporation of the
safety valve into the Guidelines, see supra note 76 and accompanying text), none of
those factors explain the decade-long decline in drug sentences.
92. See id. at 1130-33. Bowman and Heise concluded that "for the better part
of a decade the front-line actors in the federal criminal justice system ... employed
their discretionary powers persistently and progressively to produce ever-lower average drug sentences." Id. at 1127.
93. Id. at 1132. Bowman and Heise do not argue that a critical number of
prosecutors and judges feel that the severe drug sentences are fundamentally unjust (though some prosecutors and many judges undoubtedly do). Instead, it is
enough to explain their results if "a large enough number of front-line actors,
particularly judges and prosecutors, believe that strict enforcement of the Guidelines in drug cases is not necessary to achieve justice." Id. (emphasis in original).
94. See also Bowman, supra note 8, at 339-41 (describing-and criticizingeffect that overly severe drug sentences have on prosecutors' cooperation
decisions).
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roughly the same trajectory as overall cooperation rates: peaking at 38% in
95
1994, and gradually declining to just under 30% today.

95. The recent decline in cooperation rates in drug cases likely has several
causes, but one notable cause is the explosion of drug arrests and prosecutions
along the Mexican border. Since the federal government began its Southwest Border Initiative around 1995, federal drug prosecutions have almost doubled-from
12,000 to 22,000 each year-and much of that increase has come from the five
southwest border districts (Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico, Western
Texas and Southern Texas). See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1996 YEAR-END REPORT OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, IN THE THIRD BRANCH 3 (1997) (noting that increasing
criminal caseload in federal courts was primarily due to immigration and drug
filings in districts along U.S.-Mexican border); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1998 YEAREND REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, IN THE

H.

THIRD BRANCH

5 (1999) (same);

1997 YEAR-END REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, IN THE
THIRD BRANCH 4 (1998) (same). In 2000, almost one-third of all drug trafficking
prosecutions were in the five southwest border districts. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2000 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE tbl. 9 [hereinafter
2000 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE], available at http://www.ussc.gov/judpack/
jp2000.html. Most of those cases were immigration related (i.e., illegal immigrants
caught coming across the border with drugs), and many of the defendants did not
face severe sentences, either because they were caught with small quantities or
because they were caught with marijuana. See Alan D. Bersin & Judith S. Feigin,
The Rule of Law at the Margin: Reinventing ProsecutionPolicy in the Southern District of
California, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 285, 290-99 (1998) (describing drug smuggling
prosecutions and prosecution policy in Southern District of California). Indeed,
in 2000, less than one-third of all drug trafficking prosecutions nationwide involved marijuana, while in the five southwest border districts, approximately 70%
of all drug trafficking prosecutions were marijuana cases. See 2000 SENTENCING
STATISTICS BY STATE, supra, fig. A. The distortion to the overall statistics caused by
the border districts is significant: if the border districts are excluded from the nationwide numbers, the cooperation rate for drug trafficking cases in 2000 exceeds
33%. See id. at tbl. 9; see also app. tbl. 1 (this Article).
WILLIAM

REHNQUIST,
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FIGURE 2

9 6

NATIONWIDE COOPERATION RATES IN DRUG TRAFFICKING CASES

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Cooperation rates for drug cases are even more striking when compared to cooperation rates for non-drug cases.
96. Figure 2 shows the percentage of federal defendants in narcotics
trafficking cases who received substantial assistance departures in a particular fiscal
year ("narcotics trafficking offenses" excludes prosecutions for simple narcotics
possession and prosecutions for using a communications facility to commit a
narcotics offense). The information in Figure 2 comes from the Sentencing
Commission's ANNUAL SOURCEBOOK OF SENTENCING STATISTICS (1996-2000) and
ANNUAL REPORT (1989-1995). The percentages from 1989 and 1990 were derived
from a 25% random sample of cases. Information from 1991 through 2000
includes all cases. See 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 66, at tbl. 27; 1999
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 77, at tbl. 27; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 77, at tbl. 27;
1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 77, at tbi. 27; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 70, at
tbl. 27; UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT tbl. 32

[hereinafter 1995 ANNUAL
ANNUAL

REPORT

SENTENCING COMMISSION,
REPORT];

REPORT]; UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,

tbl. 34 [hereinafter

1993

1994

ANNUAL REPORT

1994

UNITED

STATES

tbl. 67 [hereinafter 1993

ANNUAL

ANNUAL

REPORT];

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT tbl. 5
ANNUAL REPORT]; UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1991

[hereinafter 1992
ANNUAL

REPORT

tbi. 55 [hereinafter

1991

ANNUAL

REPORT];

UNITED

STATES

tbl. S [hereinafter 1990 ANNUAL
REPORT]; UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT tbl. XII
[hereinafter 1989 ANNUAL REPORT]. The percentages reflected in Figure 2 are as
SENTENCING COMMISSION,

1990

ANNUAL REPORT

follows:
Nationwide Cooperation Rates in Drug Trafficking Cases
1989

1990

1991 11992

1993

1994

1995

1996 11997

1998

1999

2000

10.6% 12.6% 21.0% 25.6% 33.6% 38.0% 37.2% 34.4% 31.4% 31.1% 29.3% 27.8%

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002

21

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 8
VIiLANovA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47: p. 921

FIGURE 3
NATIONWIDE COOPERATION RATES IN DRUG TRAFFICKING CASES AND NON97

DRUG TRAFFICKING CASES

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
As Figure 3 shows, consistently over the past five years, one out of
every three or four drug defendants has cooperated, while only about one
out of every ten other defendants has cooperated. The difference is
largely explained by two factors: the extent to which drug offenders can
cooperate (because of the availability of accomplices) and the extent to
which drug offenders are willing to cooperate (because of the severe
sentences for drug offenses). The interplay of these factors can be illus97. Figure 3 shows the percentage of federal defendants in narcotics
trafficking cases that received substantial assistance departures in a particular fiscal
year and the percentage of defendants in all other cases who received substantial
assistance departures in a particular fiscal year. The percentages from 1989 and
1990 were derived from a 25% random sample of cases. Information from 1991
through 2000 includes all cases. The percentages for drug trafficking cases come
from the ANNUAL SOURCEBOOKS and ANNUAL REPORTS listed supra in note 96. The
percentages for non-drug trafficking cases were computed from the same sources.
The percentages reflected in Figure 3 are as follows:
Nationwide Cooperation Rates

1989 11990 11991 11992 11993 11994 11995 11996

1997 11998

1999 12000

Drug Trafficking Cases
10.6% 12.6% ]21.0% 125.6% 33.6% 38.0% 137.2% 34.4% 131.4% 31.1% 129.3% 127.8%
Non-Drug Trafficking Cases

1.8%1 3.5%1 55%1 7.5%1 7.7%1 9.8%113.8% 113.0% 111.6% [11.4%11.3% 111.0%
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trated by comparing cooperation rates for different types offenses (Figure
4).
FIGURE 4
NATIONWIDE COOPERATION RATES FOR SELECTED PRIMARY

OFFENSES (1996-2000)98

With respect to cooperation rates, these primary offenses fall into
three groups. In one group-the high cooperation rate group-are those
offenses that typically involve accomplices and typically carry severe
sentences. Drug trafficking leads the way, followed closely by racketeering
and money laundering. 99 In the middle group are various offensessome white-collar, some violent-that sometimes (but not always) involve
accomplices and sometimes (but not always) carry severe sentences: fraud,
98. Figure 4 shows the percentage of federal defendants who received
substantial assistance departures for particular types of offenses during fiscal years
1996 through 2000. The information in Figure 4 comes from the 1996-2000
SOURCEBOOKS. See supra note 101. The percentages reflected in Figure 4 are as
follows: drug trafficking (31.0%); racketeering (30.1%); money laundering
(28.6%); fraud (16.9%); obstruction (14.5%); robbery (14.5%); tax (13.5%);
firearms (13.0%); forgery (11.8%); larceny (7.3%); embezzlement (4.2%);
immigration (3.7%); and drug possession (3.2%).
99. It is not surprising to find racketeering and money laundering in the
same group as drug trafficking. Indeed, not only do those offenses often involve
criminal groups organized like drug trafficking rings, but those criminal groups
are often engaged in drug trafficking itself. Indeed, racketeering and money laundering prosecutions are often used as vehicles to attack drug trafficking organizations. See, e.g., Matthew Purdy, Using the RacketeeringLaw to BringDown Street Gangs,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1994, at 1 (describing federal RICO prosecutions brought
against violent drug gangs).
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obstruction ofjustice, robbery, tax offenses, firearms offenses and forgery.
In the last group- the low-cooperation rate group-are those offenses
that typically do not involve accomplices and typically do not carry severe
sentences: larceny, embezzlement, immigration offenses and drug
possession.
D.

Cooperation Departures and Disparity

This picture of rampant cooperation is, to many, disturbing.1 00 Most
commentators view cooperation as a necessary evil that should be tolerated but not encouraged. 10 1 The criticisms of cooperation generally come
in three forms. First, cooperation is said to engender perjury. 10 2 Cooperator perjury is a risk in all cases, but it is a particularly serious risk in drug
cases, because the incentives for defendants to cooperate are so high. Second, cooperation is criticized for sending a mixed moral message-for re10 3
warding betrayal at the expense of loyalty.
The third (and to me the most powerful) criticism of cooperation is
that it undermines uniformity and results in disproportionate and unfair
sentences.' 0 4 Put simply, if 30% of drug defendants are cooperating,
those defendants receive a monumental sentencing benefit (on average,
half-off their sentence) 105 that the other 70% simply do not receive. And
what is most troubling about that disparity is that these sentencing benefits
may be given out by prosecutors in a way that has a disparate racial impact.
In 1997, the Sentencing Commission published the results of a sophisticated multivariate study of cooperation and race in drug cases, which
found that non-minority defendants were significantly more likely 10to6 receive cooperation departures than Black and Hispanic defendants.
100. See Weinstein, supra note 13, at 564-65.
101. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, DepartingIs Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year ofJudicial
Revolt on "SubstantialAssistance" DeparturesFollows a Decade of ProsecutorialIndiscipline,
29 STETSON L. REv. 7, 46 (1999) (describing cooperation as example of prosecutors "using unsavory methods in pursuit of laudable ends"); Weinstein, supra note
13, at 568 (stating that cooperation is "a uniquely powerful and problematic
prosecutorial weapon" and noting that it is necessary to "control this exercise of
discretion"). These criticisms come from both sides of the criminal practice aisle.
For example, Frank Bowman is a former federal prosecutor and former counsel to
the Sentencing Commission. Ian Weinstein is a former federal defender.
102. See generally Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment,68 FORDHAM L. REV.917, 921 (1999) (examining, through interviews with former prosecutors, extent to which cooperators lie
and ability of prosecutors to detect those lies).
103. See Gould, supra note 13, at 873 (examining inmate moral systems);
Weinstein, supra note 13, at 621-25 (criticizing "government endorsement of morally ambiguous behavior").
104. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 8, at 341-44 (describing negative effects of
cooperation); Weinstein, supra note 13, at 611-17 (explaining who benefits).
105. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing trends in sentencing and cooperation rates since implementation of Guidelines).
106. See SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE STAFF WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note
88, at 149. The Commission examined drug trafficking cases from 1994 and found
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This racial disparity in cooperation probably stems, in part, from
overt prosecutorial preferences for cooperators who the prosecutor thinks
will make "good" witnesses: those who speak English, those who are better
educated and more articulate and those whom a jury may find more appealing (or less threatening). 10 7 This racial disparity is also, no doubt, the
result of pernicious, but persistent, racial biases. There is little reason to
think that prosecutors are more able to avoid unconscious racism than the
rest of us. 10 8 Although it cannot be proven empirically, it is not hard to
imagine that prosecutors are more likely to "sign up" defendants with
whom they can more easily identify and are more likely to give a sentencing benefit to defendants with whom they can empathize. 10 9 The resultthe troubling result-is that the benefit of the cooperation departure falls
inordinately to white defendants.
There is more to the story of disparity, because many defendants who
do not receive cooperation departures nevertheless receive some other
kind of downward departure, such as a heartland departure. When cooperation departures are combined with these other departures, almost 45%
of drug defendants are sentenced outside the Guidelines grid (Figure
5).110 Uniformity and the restriction of discretion may be the theoretical
foundation of the Guidelines system, but the practice-at least in drug
trafficking cases-is quite different.

that "Non-Minorities was the most likely racial group to receive a substantial assistance motion [30%], followed by Blacks [21%] and Hispanics [19%]." Id.
107. See id. at 148, tbl. 22. The Sentencing Commission study also found
other variables in drug trafficking cases consistent with this conclusion: United
States citizens (25%) were more likely than non-citizens (21%) to cooperate; defendants with high school degrees (26%) were more likely to cooperate than less
educated defendants (23%) and women (31%) were more likely to cooperate than
men (24%); English-speakers, and women were more likely to receive cooperation
departures. See id.
108. See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 778-82 (E.D. Mo.) (discuss-

ing persistence of unconscious racism in criminal law), rev'd 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir.
1994); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67

L. REv. 13, 34-38 (1998) (describing how unconscious racism may permeate race-neutral prosecutorial decisions); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 323
(1987).
109. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. This unproven, but reasonable, fear of racial empathy lay at the heart of the criticisms ofjudicial discretion in
pre-Guidelines sentencing.
110. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
FORDHAM
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FIGURE 5
I

NATIONWIDE DEPARTURE RATES FOR DRUG TRAFFICKING CASES II
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Even this picture does not do justice to the depth of disparity in federal drug sentences, because the single most important factor in determining whether a defendant gets a cooperation departure is not the
defendant's race, his role in the offense or the type of drug involved in the
offense, but rather where he commits his offense-in other words, which
1 12
United States Attorney's Office ends up prosecuting him.
There has always been variation among districts in their cooperation
rates. On one level, this variation is not surprising. U.S. Attorneys are
111. Figure 5 shows the percentage 6f federal defendants in narcotics
trafficking cases that received substantial assistance departures in a particular fiscal
year and the percentage of federal defendants in narcotics trafficking cases who
received other kinds of downward departures in a particular fiscal year. The
information in Figure 5 comes from the ANNUAL SOURCEBOOKs and ANNUAL
REPORTS listed supra in note 96. The percentages for 1989 and 1990 were derived
from a 25% random sample of cases. Information from 1991 through 2000
includes all cases. The percentages in Figure 5 are as follows:
Nationwide Departure Rates for Drug Trafficking Cases
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
5K
10.6% 12.6% 21.0% 25.6% 33.6% 38.0% 37.2% 34.4% 31.4% 31.1% 29.3% 27.8%
Other 11.5% 9.2% 6.4% 6.6% 7.7% 8.4% 9.7% 10.1% 12.3% 13.0% 15.6% 15.3%
Total 22.1% 21.8% 27.4% 33.2% 41.3% 46.4% 46.9% 44.5% 43.7% 44.1% 44.9% 43.1%

112. See SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE STAFF WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note
88, at 161 (finding district's substantial assistance rate had more effect on whether
defendant cooperated than any other factor).
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essentially local operatives.' 13 Though they are a part of the Justice Department and report to the Attorney General, they are-and should beresponsive to local concerns and sensitive to the local legal culture.' 14 But
even accounting for local variations, the geographic disparity in cooperation rates is astonishing. In 2000, overall cooperation rates ranged from a
low of 3% to a high of 50%. 1 15 In drug prosecutions, those differences are
even starker, ranging from a low of 0% to a high of 80%.116
A comparison of high-cooperation districts and low-cooperation districts will illustrate the disparate approaches used by various U.S. Attorney's Offices in prosecuting drug offenses. Figure 6 shows the drug
cooperation rates of twelve districts: the six districts with the highest drug
cooperation rates and the six districts with the lowest drug cooperation
rates (See Table 1 in Appendix for complete 2000 drug departure rates
and median drug sentences for all federal district courts). The six highcooperation districts all have drug cooperation rates over 60%. The six
low-cooperation districts all have drug cooperation rates below 12%.

113. SeeJAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATToRNEYvs
IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 198-206 (1978) (discussing ways in which
"direct and indirect pressures from the district affect [U.S. Attorneys'] behavior").
114. See Daniel C. Richman, The ChangingBoundaries Between Federal and Local
Law Enforcement, in BOUNDARY CHANGES IN CRIMINAl.JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS 81, 92
(Charles M. Friel ed., 2000) (noting that involvement of individual members of
Congress in appointment of U.S. Attorneys makes it likely that U.S. Attorneys will
be quite responsive to local political concerns).
115. See 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 66, at tbl. 26. The Eastern District of
Oklahoma had the lowest overall cooperation rate at 3.1%, while the Northern
District of New York had the highest overall rate at 50.9%.
116. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (showing significant disparity
in statistics). Although the Sentencing Commission's Sourcebooks do not include
district-by-district statistics broken down by primary offense, the Commission's
2000 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 95, which is available on the
Commission's web site, does. In 2000, the Eastern District of Oklahoma had a
drug cooperation rate of 0% (out of eighteen cases); the Northern District of New
York had a drug cooperation rate of 80% (160 out of 201 cases). See id. For a
similar analysis of inter-district cooperation disparities in 1996, see Weinstein,
supra note 13, at 602-08.
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FIGURE 6
COOPERATION RATES IN DRUG TRAFFICKING CASES BY DISTRICT (2000)117
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The disparity in cooperation rates among these districts is striking: in

the six high-departure districts, 65% of drug defendants received a cooperation departure; in the six low-departure districts, only 8% of drug defendants cooperated. When heartland departures are added, the
disparities are just as striking: in the high-cooperation districts, over 70%
of defendants received some kind of downward departure; in the low-cooperation districts, only 13% received a downward departure. For the defendants, this difference is real: drug defendants sentenced in the six highdeparture districts received an average sentence of eighty months' imprisonment, while defendants sentenced in the six low-departure districts re11 8
ceived an average sentence of 110 months.
117. Figure 6 shows the percentage of federal defendants in drug cases that
received substantial assistance departures during fiscal year 2000. The information
in Figure 6 comes from 2000 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 95, tbls.
7, 9 for each respective district. The complete 2000 drug departure rates and
median drug sentences for all federal judicial districts (including the twelve
districts in Figure 6) are shown in Table 1, which appears in the Appendix to this
Article. Because its sample was so small, I have excluded the Northern Mariana
Islands, which actually had the highest drug cooperation rate (four out of five
cases). See app. tbl. 1; 2000 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 95, at tbl.
9.
118. While the thirty-month differential between the average sentence in the
high-cooperation group and the average sentence in the low-cooperation group is
noteworthy, caution is warranted in drawing broad conclusions from that differential. Because the Guidelines system is so complex and because so many different
factors affect each sentence, see infra notes 53-127 and accompanying text, it is
difficult to draw conclusions about the relationship of two variables without a re-
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Is there any explanation for these widely divergent approaches? Not
one that is readily apparent. 119 The volume of drug cases in a particular
district does not explain the variation because both the high-cooperation
group and the low-cooperation group contain districts with large numbers
of drug cases, districts with average numbers of drug cases and districts
120
with small numbers of drug cases.
gression analysis. See Linda Drazga Maxfield, Trends in the CriminalHistory Category
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 13 FED. SENTENCING REP. 318, 322 (2001)
(cautioning against using aggregate sentencing statistics that "mask the individual
guidelines patterns of guideline case mix" and noting that such variables as "district policy and district case characteristic variations [may] mask impacts and lead
to analytical misinterpretations"). Indeed, when Ian Weinstein did a regression
analysis of district cooperation rates and sentence severity in 1996, he found no
significant correlation. See Weinstein, supra note 13, at 608-11, 633-44. Those results may be explained by the distorting effect of the southwest border districts.
The prevalence of small immigration-related drug cases (including large numbers
of marijuana prosecutions) in those districts gives them low cooperation rates and
low sentences. In 2000, the five border districts (Southern California, Arizona,
New Mexico, Western Texas and Southern Texas) accounted for 31% of all drug
cases. Their combined cooperation rate was 16% and their mean sentence was 40
months. See 2000 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 95, at tbls. 7, 9. See
generally supra note 95 and accompanying text; Kevin R. Johnson, U.S. Border Enforcement: Drugs, Migrants, and the Rule of Law, 47 VILL. L. REv. 897 (2002).
119. A few high or low cooperation rates do have ready explanations. For
example, the cooperation rate in the Eastern District of Virginia is low, in part,
because of that district's "rocket docket." Because judges in the Eastern District of
Virginia generally insist that criminal cases go to trial or plea within seventy days of
indictment, prosecutors often do not have enough time to complete the proffer
sessions needed to reach cooperation agreements. As a result, cooperators in that
district typically do not receive "substantial assistance" departures, but rather have
their sentences reduced after the fact pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. See Daniel C. Richman, The Challenges of Investigating Section
5Kl.1 in Practice,11 FED. SENT. REP. 75, 75 (1998). Even if the Eastern District of
Virginia is excluded from the low-cooperation group, the sentencing differential is
still significant, with the average sentence in the low-cooperation group 15%
higher than the average sentence in the high-cooperation group. See 2000 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, supra note 95, at tbs. 7, 9.
120. The median number of drug cases for all districts in 2000 was 135.5. As
the following shows, the districts in both the high-cooperation group and the lowcooperation group fall evenly above and below that median:

High-Departure
Districts
D. Idaho
D. Me.
M.D. Ala.
N.D.N.Y.

Drug Prosecutions by District (2000)
Low-Departure
Total Drug Cases
Districts
37
E.D. Okla.
43
E.D. Wa.
79
N.D. W. Va.
201
S.D. I1.

Total Drug Cases
18
69
115
244

W.D.N.C.

291

D.P.R.

325

W.D. Mo.

296

E.D. Va.

415

The information in this table comes from 2000 SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE,
supra note 95, at tbl. 9. A 1997 Sentencing Commission study, after a much more
sophisticated statistical analysis, reached a similar conclusion: a district's caseload

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002

29

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 8

950

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47: p. 921

Nor does geography explain much of the variation. Both groups contain urban districts and rural districts, eastern districts and western districts and northern districts and southern districts. 121 Comparing districts
within the same state yields similar incongruities: the Southern District of
Illinois had a drug cooperation rate in 2000 of 4%, while the Central District of Illinois had a rate more than thirteen times higher at 54%; the
Southern District of New York had a drug cooperation rate of 23%, while
the Northern District of New York had a rate more than three times
higher at 80%; the Middle District of North Carolina had a drug cooperation rate of 22%, while the Western District of North Carolina had a rate
almost three times higher at 61%; the Southern District of Florida had a
rate of 19%, while the Northern District of Florida had more than double
that rate at 45%.122

It is difficult to pinpoint any one characteristic-whether it be geography, district caseload or any other factor-that drives cooperation rates.
These differences most likely result from a complex mix of factors best
described as "local culture." As one commentator has argued, the Guidelines have created a system of separate local systems, each operating within
the framework set up by the Guidelines, but adhering to different local
customs and practices. 123 Within the local systems, the repeat players in
the process-particularly prosecutors and judges-can manipulate various
Guidelines factors to arrive at customary sentences. 124 Substantial assis1 25
tance departures are a significant part of these local cultures.
has no significant effect on the probability of receiving a substantial assistance departure. See SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE STAFF WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note
88, at 160. The study did find, however, some statistical correlation between substantial assistance rates in drug cases and individual prosecutor caseloads (computed by dividing the total cases in a district by the number of prosecutors in that
district). Defendants prosecuted in districts with higher prosecutor caseloads were
more likely to receive a substantial assistance departure, while defendants prosecuted in districts with lower prosecutor caseloads were less likely to receive such
departures. See id. Interestingly, however, the study found no correlation between
substantial assistance rates and a district's drug caseload ratio. See id. at 160-61.
121. Notwithstanding the mix of urban and rural districts in both the highcooperation group and the low-cooperation group, there is some correlation between geography and substantial assistance rate. A 1997 Sentencing Commission
study found that defendants in the Northeast and the South were somewhat more
likely to receive substantial assistance departures than defendants in the Midwest
and West. See SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE STAFF WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note
88, at 158.
122. See infra app. tbl. 1; see also Weinstein, supra note 13, at 603-04 (showing
similar, albeit smaller, variations within states).
123. See Bowman, supra note 8, at 349 (describing how similarly-situated defendants within region are treated similarly).
124. See id. at 341-47 (discussing departures, charge bargaining and fact bar-

gaining as methods used by prosecutors to manipulate Guidelines sentences).
125. See SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE STAFF WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note
88, at 42-52 (discussing widely varied substantial assistance practices in eight different districts based on interviews ofjudges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and probation officers); Lisa M. Farabee, DisparateDepartures Under the Federal Sentencing
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Indeed, and this is an important caveat, it is impossible to know how
much weight to attach to cooperation rates alone, because cooperation
departures are only one factor at work in this complex system. It may be
that prosecutors and judges in low cooperation districts are using other
methods (such as charge bargaining, fact bargaining or heartland depar126
tures) to ameliorate harsh drug sentences.
Whatever the cause, these gross disparities in cooperation rates are an
indictment of a Guidelines system premised on uniformity. 127 In some
districts, over 90% of all drug defendants receive the (often severe) sentence mandated by the Guidelines grid, while in other districts, nearly twothirds of drug defendants are sentenced by judges who have unfettered
discretion to impose any sentence outside the grid. Something needs to
be fixed.
III.

IN DEFENSE OF COOPERATION (AND DIsPARITY)

There are several possible ways to remedy these disparities. One is to
scrap the Guidelines and the mandatory minimums and to reduce overall
drug sentences. If drug sentences were less severe and more flexible, defendants would have much less incentive to cooperate and prosecutors
would be much less tempted to use cooperation as a way to ameliorate
harsh sentences. Congress, however, has shown little sign of wavering in
its commitment either to the Guidelines or to fighting a war on drugs
through stiff prison sentences.

128

Guidelines: A Tale of Two Districts, 30 CONN. L. REv. 569, 588-91 (1998) (comparing
prosecutors' differing views of substantial assistance departures in District of Massachusetts and District of Connecticut); Lee, supra note 13, at 125-27 (summarizing
prosecutors' differing departure policies in Central District of Illinois and District
of Columbia); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An
EmpiricalStudy of Chargingand BargainingPractices Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 501, 556 (1992) (comparing 5KI.1 practices in three U.S.
Attorney's Offices and concluding that one office "has the tightest policy with respect to what is required" for cooperation departure, while second office has "a
rather liberal definition of who and what qualify" for departure, and third office
has "virtually no standard for determining what qualifies" for departure).
126. See Richman, supra note 119, at 75 (noting that it is difficult "for an outsider to figure out exactly when charge discounts or sentencing fact discounts are
used in lieu of § 5Kl.1 motions"); Weinstein, supra note 13, at 608 (noting "other
ways" in which prosecutor can mitigate non-cooperator's sentence: "[t ] he prosecutor may choose to offer a lenient plea bargain, manipulate the sentence calculations through sentence factor bargaining or by omission of relevant conduct or
agree not to oppose a defendant's motion for a non-substantial assistance downward departure").
127. See Bowman, supra note 8, at 349 ("For Guidelines supporters like myself,
it becomes increasingly difficult to say that the Guidelines have succeeded in producing a sentencing regime that is applied uniformly nationwide."); Weinstein,
supra note 13, at 615-16 (noting that most defenders of Sentencing Guidelines
"equate fairness with uniformity").
128. See supranotes 8-12 and accompanying text; see also Bowman, supra note
8, at 350 ("Leaving all other considerations aside, the political realities are that the
Guidelines will not be abolished anytime soon, if ever."). At this point, any assault

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002

31

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 8

952

VILLANovA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47: p. 921

Another option is to impose national uniformity on prosecutors' cooperation practices. Many commentators have argued that the Department ofJustice should enact (and enforce) centralized policies to reduce
the variation in cooperation rates among districts. 129 Such centralized
policies would, in my opinion, be a cure worse than the disease. The political history of our war on drugs has demonstrated that the further removed policy-makers are from the real defendants impacted by their
policies, the harsher their policies are likely to be. As Bowman and Heise
have shown, the recent decline in drug sentences has not come from enactments by Congress or by the Sentencing Commission, nor from
changes in justice Department policy, but rather from discretionary decisions made by the prosecutors and judges who see the defendants and
know the realities of their offenses.13 0 A centralized cooperation policy, if
enforced, would almost certainly reduce overall cooperation rates and
raise overall drug sentences.
A third solution for the disparity problem would be to increase cooperation in drug cases. As counterintuitive as it may sound, if more districts
adopted the high-cooperation, high-departure approach, we might end up
with less disparity (or, at least, less offensive disparity).
A.

Cooperation in a High-Cooperation,High-DepartureDistrict

Cooperation in a high-cooperation, high-departure district should
look different from cooperation in other districts in two ways. First, prosecutors will be less discerning about who gets to cooperate. In this highcooperation model, almost any drug defendant who wants to cooperate
can, so long as the defendant is completely forthcoming and entirely
truthful. That does not mean that every drug defendant will cooperate.
As noted above, some defendants will refuse to cooperate under any circumstances, either because they fear retaliation or because they refuse to
betray their accomplices. Moreover, prosecutors will rightly refuse cooperation-even very valuable cooperation-offered by a defendant whose
crimes were particularly egregious (for example, a defendant who commit13 1
ted homicide in connection with drug dealing).
on the Guidelines system is more likely to come from the Supreme Court, not
Congress. See generally Jacqueline E. Ross, What Makes Sentencing Facts Controversial?
FourProblems Obscured By One Solution, 47 VILL. L. REv. 965, 981 (2002) (indicating
that Supreme Court might find Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional).
129. See, e.g.,

SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE STAFF WORKING

GROUP REPORT, supra

note 88, at 194 (Sentencing Commission study recommending, among other
things, "[e]stablishment of a national policy on substantial assistance for prosecutors"); Lee, supranote 13, at 129-30 (criticizing Department ofJustice for not sufficiently controlling inter-district disparity in cooperation policies and practices).
130. See Bowman & Heise, supra note 27, at 1130-33; supra notes 89-92 and
accompanying text.
131. Of course, even extremely high culpability can sometimes be outweighed
by extraordinarily valuable cooperation. For example, Sammy "the Bull" Gravano
was a star cooperating witness in the successful prosecution of Gambino family
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It is impossible to predict with any precision how many drug defendants will be willing and able to cooperate under this model, but a reasonable estimate is that at least two-thirds of all drug defendants would attempt
to cooperate if given the chance. 132 In 1997, a Sentencing Commission
working group reviewed sixty-four conspiracies (most of them drug conspiracies) in thirty-nine different districts.' 33 The Commission found that
two-thirds of all defendants provided some sort of assistance though only
one-third received a cooperation departure.1 34 That percentage is consistent with my experience prosecuting drug cases; on average, about twothirds of all drug defendants wanted to cooperate.1 35 Incidentally, that
was also the drug cooperation rate of the three highest cooperation districts in 1999.136
The second way in which high-cooperation districts differ from lowcooperation districts is in the average size of the sentence reduction for
cooperators. In theory, as cooperation rates increase, the extent of cooperation departures should decrease. In a low-cooperation district, prosecutors will seek out defendants whose cooperation will be extremely
valuable. In a high-cooperation district, where prosecutors are less selective in choosing cooperators, more defendants with less to offer will become cooperators. Presumably, those defendants with less to offer will
137
receive smaller departures, at least on average.
crime boss John Gotti, notwithstanding the nineteen murders that Gravano himself committed. See United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-50 (2d Cir. 1993).
132. See LINDA DRAGZA MAXFIELD &JOHN H. KRAMER, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE:
AN EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY 9, 26, ex. 5
(1998) (showing that two-thirds of defendants try to cooperate).

133. See SUBSTANTIAL

ASSISTANCE STAFF WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note

88, at 76-77 (detailing conspiracy study).
134. See MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 132, at 26, ex. 5 (showing that only
half of defendants who cooperate receive departure). The working group reviewed sixty-four randomly selected conspiracy prosecutions from 1992 in which at
least one defendant cooperated. Of the 234 defendants in those cases for which
information was available, 158 (or 67.5%) provided some kind of assistance to the
government, though only sixty-one (or 36.8%) received substantial assistance departures. See id. at 26, ex. 5; SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE STAFF WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 88, at 73-108 (analyzing conspiracy prosecutions).
135. Not all of those defendants ultimately became cooperators. The Southern District of New York, where I was a prosecutor from 1995 through 1998, is not
a "high-cooperation" district. Instead, its drug cooperation rate has consistently
been near the national average of approximately 33%. See Weinstein, supra note
13, at 564, 592 (former federal defender noting that many defendants offer to
cooperate but fail to "close the deal" and that "[d]espite all the disincentive and
risks, defendants flock to proffer sessions"); SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE STAFF WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 88, at 48 (reporting that in one large U.S. Attorney's office "it was not unusual for all the defendants in a drug conspiracy to
cooperate and receive a departure") (emphasis added).
136. See fig. 6, supra note 117 and accompanying text (Northern District of
New York: 69.7%; Western District of North Carolina: 68.7%; Southern District of
Indiana: 67%).
137. The Guidelines list several factors that the court should consider in deciding whether and how much to depart for a cooperator. The first factor is "the
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There is only limited empirical support for my hypothesis that an increase in cooperation rates should yield a decrease in the extent of the
average cooperation departures. The Sentencing Commission's Substantial Assistance Staff Working Group study found a statistically significant
correlation between overall cooperation rates and the extent of cooperation departures. 13 8 As hypothesized, cooperators sentenced in districts
with high overall cooperation rates received smaller departures than cooperators sentenced in districts with low or medium cooperation rates. In39
terestingly, however, this correlation was not evident in drug cases.'
The absence of this correlation in drug cases could result from several
factors. First, a district's drug cooperation rate may be related to judges'
overall views of the appropriateness of drug sentences under the Guidelines. In other words, a district's choice of the high-cooperation approach
may reflect a local culture that is unenthusiastic about harsh drug
sentences. If so, judges in that district would be expected to award rather
large departures to drug cooperators when given the chance. Similarly, if
a district's low-cooperation rate reflects a local culture that is comfortable
with harsh sentences in drug cases, judges would be expected to be true to
that culture in deciding how far to depart for drug cooperators. 140 Seccourt's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance,
taking into consideration the government's evaluation of the assistance rendered."
U.S.S.G. § 5KL1.l(a) (1) (2000).
138. See SUBSTANTIAL

ASSISTANCE STAFF WORKING GROUP REPORT,

supra note

88, at 177 (explaining relationship between cooperation rates and departures).
139. See id.
140. Technically, under the Guidelines system, a judge sentencing a cooperator is supposed to determine the extent of the departure simply by evaluating the
defendant's cooperation, not by considering the overall appropriateness of the
sentences. Section 5K1.1 instructs the court to determine the "appropriate reduction" by considering the following:
(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the government's evaluation
of the assistance rendered; (2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant; (3) the
nature and extent of the defendant's assistance; (4) any injury suffered,
or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting
from his assistance; (5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance.
U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.I (a). And although section 5K1.1 indicates that the court may consider other factors, the strong implication is that those factors must be related to
the defendants cooperation. See id. at cmt. n.2 ("The sentencing reduction for
assistance to authorities shall be considered independently of any reduction for
acceptance of responsibility. Substantial assistance is directed to the investigation
and prosecution of criminal activities by persons other than the defendant, while
acceptance of responsibility is directed to the defendant's affirmative recognition
of responsibility for his own conduct."). In reality, however, ajudge freed from the
Guidelines grid by a substantial assistance motion will often award whatever sentence that the judge feels is just, considering not only the defendant's cooperation,
but the overall appropriateness of the sentence as well. See Bruce M. Selya &John
C. Massaro, The IllustrativeRole of SubstantialAssistance Departures in Combating UltraUniformity, 35 B.C. L. REV. 799, 819 (1994) (federal district judges arguing that
latitude afforded sentencing judges to sentence cooperator based upon "variable
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ond, as with most drug prosecution statistics, the overall correlation between cooperation rate and departure size will be distorted by the border
districts, all of which have low cooperation rates, low averages sentences
14 1
and, presumably, small average cooperation departures.
My point, however, is not that high-cooperation districts will always
have smaller departures than low-cooperation districts. Indeed, because
so many factors are at work in cooperator sentencing, it is not surprising
that there is no simple bivariate relationship between cooperation rates
and sentence lengths. Rather, the point is that as a district moves from a
low-cooperation approach to a high-cooperation approach, assuming all
other factors remain constant, the extent of the average cooperation departure should decrease because the average cooperator will be less
valuable.
The same argument applies to sentence severity. As Figure 6 shows,
sentences in the six highest cooperation districts were thirty months
shorter than sentences in the six lowest cooperation districts. While these
numbers do not necessarily suggest a direct correlation between cooperation rates and sentence severity across all districts, 1 42 they do provide an
indication of what a difference cooperation departures can make. The
average departure for a drug cooperator in 2000 was thirty-eight
months. 143 As a district moves from a low-cooperation approach to a highcooperation approach, assuming all other factors remain the same, sentence severity cannot help but decrease.
B.

The Advantages of the High-CooperationApproach

The high-cooperation approach has several advantages over other approaches. Let me start with the obvious.
1.

Crime Fighting

Cooperation is an extraordinarily effective tool in fighting drug trafficking. Increased cooperation will mean more cases made against more
drug traffickers. 1 4 4 Of course, if most defendants are cooperating, the net
result may not be an increase in aggregate prison time served by those
relevant factors" gives judges ability "to import a wide range of mitigating circumstances into the departure calculus").
141. See supra notes 95, 118 and accompanying text (explaining how drug cooperation rates have followed same trend as overall cooperation rates).
142. As noted above, Ian Weinstein's 1996 regression analysis of cooperation
rates and sentence severity found no significant correlation between the two. That
analysis, however, may have been distorted by large numbers of marijuana cases in
the border districts. See supra note 119 (discussing correlation between coopera-

tion rates and reduced sentences in border districts).
143. See 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 66, at tbl. 30 (providing degree of decrease for substantial assistance).
144. It is true that most prosecutors already seek to maximize the crime-fighting benefits resulting from cooperation. But, in the low cooperation districts,
prosecutors put greater limits on their use of cooperation so as to limit the result-
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prosecuted. But, at least in the context of the war on drugs, who needs
more prison time? 145 Moreover, because arrests and convictions are far
more important for deterrence than sentence length, 14 6 the crime fighting benefits to society will be greater in a system that focuses on making
cases and getting convictions, even at the expense of a few less years ofjail
time. Moreover, as to specific deterrence, cooperation is a particularly
powerful tool, as the cooperator's status as a "rat" often makes it impossi14 7
ble for him to return to his old haunts.
2.

Perjury

The high-cooperation approach also has less obvious benefits. For
one, the high-departure approach should lessen cooperator perjury. Perjury is always a risk with cooperators, and the only protection against perjury is skeptical prosecutors who are willing to take the time and make the
effort to rigorously corroborate their cooperators. 148 That being said, the
risk of perjury is reduced under the high-cooperation model.
For the cooperator, the important event is not providing the cooperation (such as testifying at a trial), but rather getting the cooperation agreement. The typical would-be cooperator knows that his story- what he has
to offer-must be "good enough" for it to be worth the prosecutor's while.
He must have good evidence about other criminal activity or about more
culpable participants in his own criminal activity. Either implicitly or explicitly, prosecutors convey this message, defense lawyers convey this message and, perhaps most importantly, the prison grapevine conveys this
message.
Lying, of course, carries a risk. If the cooperator is caught in the lie,
he most likely will not get signed up (or, if the lie is not uncovered until
after he signs up, he may not get the cooperation departure). The defendant who is trying to get a cooperation agreement in a low-cooperation
district must make a decision: he can tell the truth and hope that the truth
is good enough to warrant an agreement; or, he can embellish (or completely fabricate) the story to ensure it is good enough.
ing leniency for cooperators. My point is that-at least in drug cases-trading
leniency for cooperation is almost always a good deal for prosecutors.
145. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 8, at 337 ("Drug sentences are long as a
proportion of any human life. They are often longer than can be rationally justified to achieve deterrence. They are very long in comparison to the settled preGuidelines expectations of federal lawyers and judges. They are so long that they
frequently seem disproportionate and inhumane to the judges obliged to impose
them, and even to the prosecutors who work so diligently to secure them.").
146. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L.
REV. 453, 461-62 (1997) (discussing why "lengthy prison terms are not a particularly useful method of increasing deterrence effects").
147. See Simons, supra note 82.
148. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 102, at 934-40 (discussing importance of corroborating cooperators); Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warningfor Prosecutors Using
Criminals as Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1405-09 (1996) (discussing ways in
which prosecutor can test cooperator's story).
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Thus, the important lies told by a cooperadtor are not the lies told on
the witness stand; the important lies are those told in the proffer sessions
before the cooperator is signed up-because once the cooperator is signed
up, his story is not likely to change. So, one way to lessen cooperator perjury is to lessen cooperators' incentives to lie at the outset. If prosecutors
set the bar lower by not being so exacting in their demands for "good"
evidence, cooperators' incentives to lie in proffer sessions will decrease.
3.

UnwarrantedDisparity

There is no doubt that cooperation departures introduce disparity.
But the high-cooperation approach makes those disparities less offensive
in two ways: (1) the extent of the disparity (on average) will be less; and
(2) fewer defendants will be unfairly affected by the disparity. What is
offensive about disparity is not that defendants are sentenced outside the
Guidelines grid, but rather that similarly-situated defendants will receive
vastly different sentences for the same conduct. Under the current system,
approximately one-third of drug defendants nationwide receive a tremendous benefit-the cooperation departure-while the other two-thirds do
not. In the high-cooperation districts, twice as many defendants-approximately two-thirds-receive the cooperation benefit. In other words, disparity is unfair not to those defendants who get the more lenient
sentences, but rather to those defendants who get the more severe
sentences. In the low-cooperation districts, that unfairness is visited upon
90% of the defendants; in the high-cooperation districts, that unfairness is
visited upon only one-third.
Moreover, and significantly, the high-cooperation approach should
lessen racial disparities in cooperation practices. The vast majority of drug
defendants-75%-are minorities. 149 If the cooperation departure is limited (whether by local culture or official policy), prosecutors will be more
likely to favor "better" witnesses. If the threshold is lowered, however, and
anyone who is forthcoming and truthful can cooperate, then the benefit
will be opened to far more minority defendants. Put more bluntly, if prosecutors are being racist-consciously or unconsciously-in making cooperation decisions, the high-departure model is better because it requires
prosecutors to make fewer decisions. More generally, because so many
drug defendants are minorities, anything that gives judges more discretion
to reduce sentences will, in the aggregate, benefit minority defendants.
149. In 2000, 25% of drug defendants were White, 30% were Black, 43% were
Hispanic and 2% were "other." See 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 66, at tbl. 34. By
contrast, minorities are sorely underrepresented in the ranks of federal prosecutors. See, e.g., Sharon E. Grubin & John, M. Walker, Jr., Report of the Second Circuit
Task Force on Gender, Racial, and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
9, 32 (1997) (reporting that, in 1995, only 10% of Assistant U.S. Attorneys in Second Circuit were minorities).
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CONCLUSION

I recognize that my proposal is, in some respects, an attack on the
entire system of drug sentencing set up by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986 and the Sentencing Guidelines. That is not to suggest that my proposal-that more districts adopt the high-cooperation approach-is lawless or requires prosecutors to do anything improper. Indeed, it is the
approach followed by several United States Attorney's Offices around the
country (most notably the Northern District of New York with its nearly
80% drug cooperation rate). Nevertheless, what I am proposing, while
both legal and perfectly appropriate, likely would not meet with the approval of Congress, the Sentencing Commission or the Department ofJustice (the Northern District of New York notwithstanding). It is those
Washington-based institutions that have set up our current system of drug
sentences, and it is those institutions that deserve the blame for the exces150
sive sentences that result.
Our current system of fixed sentences for drug offenses puts prosecutors in a unique position. Like defense attorneys and judges, prosecutors
are on the front lines, face to face with the defendants who are being sent
to prison. But unlike defense attorneys, and even judges, prosecutors are
in a position to make a difference. Prosecutors, through their charging
decisions, plea bargains and sentencing practices, can actually do something to ameliorate the irrational severity of many drug sentences.
Some might argue that it is not for prosecutors to decide whether the
sentences enacted by Congress and the Sentencing Commission are
just. 15 1 I emphatically disagree.1 52 A prosecutor's obligation to ensure
that 'justice shall be done"15 3 does not begin and end with convicting only
150. I understand that, in some districts, a low drug cooperation rate may
result from a local culture that is entirely comfortable with the severe sentences
typically meted out under the drug Guidelines and mandatory minimums. In a
district with that culture, my argument will necessarily fall on deaf ears. I suspect,
however, that prosecutorial dissatisfaction with drug sentences is widespread, even
in low-cooperation districts. My argument to those dissatisfied prosecutors is not
that they should attempt to change their local culture, but that they should not let
their local culture be dictated by policy-makers in Washington who never see the
defendants affected by those policies.
151. See Bowman & Heise, supra note 27, at 1136 (noting that many drug war
policy-makers would be "outrage[d]" to learn that "prosecutors have quietly subverted the will of Congress expressed in statute after statute raising the penalties
for drug trafficking").
152. In this respect, I am answering in the affirmative (rather cursorily I admit) the questions posed by David Sklansky: "[H]ow should prosecutors operate
under a system of fixed sentences? Should sentencing considerations influence
charging decisions and plea offers, and if so, how?" See David A. Sklansky, Starr,
Singleton, and the Prosecutor'sRole, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 533 (1999) (noting
that "[t]he academy has ignored these questions").
153. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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the guilty. 154 In the prosecutor's world, sentencing is the bottom lineand if sentences are not just, prosecutors are not doing their job.
There are, of course, other methods that prosecutors can-and douse to ameliorate harsh drug sentences. They can engage in fact bargaining: a lawless approach that often involves misleading the court and the
probation department. 55 They can engage in charge bargaining, which
may not be lawless, but hides, or at least disguises, the sentencing reduction.1 56 Cooperation reductions, on the other hand, fall squarely within
the four corners of the Guidelines.1 57 Indeed, such departures are "encouraged" 15 8-so long as the government receives "substantial assistance"
15 9
in return.
The assistance-rendered by the cooperator-is the main advantage
of cooperation departures. Prosecutors who follow the high-cooperation
approach are not simply doling out leniency to drug dealers. Instead, they
are wielding an effective crime-fighting weapon. They are staying true to
their mission-waging war on drugs-while simultaneously tempering the
excesses of that war. The end result is more sentences that are more just
for more defendants.

154. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:
Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 60-65 (1991) (describing prosecutor's duties at trial).
155. "Fact bargaining" refers to the process by which the prosecutor and defense attorney agree on the "facts" that will go into the Guidelines calculation. See
Bowman, supra note 8, at 347 (discussing fact bargaining and describing it as
"[t]he most direct, if disingenuous, method of evading a fact-driven real offense
sentencing system").
156. "Charge bargaining" generally refers to the negotiation between the
prosecutor and the defense attorney about the charges to which the defendant will
plead. Under the Guidelines "real offense" system, charge bargaining usually will
not affect the Guidelines calculation (because uncharged conduct will still be included as "relevant conduct"). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (1) (A) (2000); Breyer, supra
note 47, at 10-12. The one exception is when the agreed upon charge carries a
maximum sentence that is less than the Guidelines sentence. See Bowman, supra
note 8, at 343-46 (describing how charge bargaining can "circumvent" Guidelines
and noting that, while it is not forbidden by Guidelines, it seems inconsistent with
Department of Justice policy that prosecutors are to charge "most serious readily
provable offense") (citing U.S. A'rrORNEY's MANUAL 9-27.410 (1995)).
157. Prosecutors can also reduce sentences through bargaining about noncooperation departures, either by consenting to or agreeing not to oppose a defendant's request for a downward departure. In many ways, this approach would be
preferable to a high-cooperation approach, because the sentence reductions
would be more explicitly connected to the equities that call for a mitigated sentence. See generally Berman, supra note 70, at 96-100 (advocating greater-and
more thoughtful-use of such departures).
158. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996).
159. Nor does the high-cooperation approach require prosecutors to manipulate the Guidelines or mislead the sentencing court. At least in drug cases, it is the
rare defendant who cannot provide the government with some assistance that can
be fairly described as "substantial" (a word that is admittedly imprecise).
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TABLE 1

DEPARTURE RATES AND MEAN PRISON SENTENCES IN DRUG TRAFFICKING CASES

(2000)

DEPARTURES
SORTED BY

TOTAL

SENTENCED

COOPERATION

DRUG

WITHIN

DEPARTURE RATE

CASES

ALL DISTRICTS
Northern
Mariana Islands
New York,
Northern

MEAN
OTHER

RANGE

COOPERATION

DOWN

N

N

%

N

%

N

22,253

12,596

56.6

6,197

27.8

3,410

1 20.0

4

80.0

5

PRISON
UPWARD

SENTENCE

N

%

MONTHS

15.3

50

0.2

75.3

0

0.0

0

0.0

29.0

201

31

15.4

160

79.6

10

5.0

0

0.0

42.0

Maine

43

15

34.9

27

62.8

1

2.3

3

7.0

45.4

Idaho

37

11

29.7

23

62.2

3

8.1

0

0.0

88.3

Western

296

105

35.5

181

61.1

10

3.4

0

0.0

72.5

North Carolina,
Western

291

97

33.3

177

60.8

17

5.8

0

0.0

112.8

Alabama, Middle

79

25

31.6

48

60.8

5

6.3

1

1.3

92.0

Louisiana,
Middle

17

7

41.2

10

58.8

0

0.0

0

0.0

58.0

Missouri,

Pennsylvania,
Middle

148

52

35.1

86

58.1

10

6.8

0

0.0

80.0

Alabama,
Southern

99

33

33.3

57

57.6

9

9.1

0

0.0

95.7

Guam

40

16

40.0

23

57.5

0

0.0

1

2.5

66.1

Colorado

112

40

35.7

61

54.5

11

9.8

0

0.0

56.7

Indiana,
Southern

93

40

43.0

50

53.8

3

3.2

0

0.0

133.6

Illinois, Central

144

56

38.9

77

53.5

10

6.9

1

0.7

121.4

Ohio, Northern

191

77

40.3

101

52.9

12

6.3

1

0.5

80.9

Pennsylvania,
Eastern

332

134

40.4

175

52.7

22

6.6

1

0.3

78.7

Ohio, Southern

140

56

40.0

71

50.7

13

9.3

0

0.0

68.5

Maryland

169

64

37.9

82

48.5

22

13.0

1

0.6

128.8

Alabama,
Northern

131

66

50.4

62

47.3

3

2.3

0

0.0

77.1

New York,
Western

113

55

48.7

53

46.9

5

4.4

0

0.0

56.2
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Florida,
Northern

199

107

53.8

90

45.2

2

1.0

0

0.0

140.3

Michigan,
Eastern

275

132

48.0

123

44.7

20

7.3

0

0.0

70.6

Georgia, Middle

169

87

51.5

74

43.8

8

4.7

0

0.0

91.6

Tennessee,
Eastern

252

140

55.6

110

43.7

2

0.8

0

0.0

84.7

South Carolina

331

182

55.0

142

42.9

6

1.8

1

0.3

108.9

Iowa, Northern

155

74

47.7

66

42.6

11

7.1

4

2.6

100.1

Mississippi,
Southern

86

48

55.8

36

41.9

2

2.3

0

0.0

68.9

Wyoming

77

38

49.4

32

41.6

7

9.1

0

0.0

77.6

Illinois,
Northern

252

127

50.4

104

41.3

21

8.3

0

0.0

86.1

Montana

147

75

51.0

59

40.1

13

8.8

0

0.0

104.7

Delaware

20

11

55.0

8

40.0

1

5.0

0

0.0

116.4

Louisiana,
Western

166

94

56.6

66

39.8

6

3.6

0

0.0

126.2

Michigan,
Western

107

55

51.4

42

39.3

9

8.4

1

0.9

94.4

Iowa, Southern

256

124

48.4

100

39.1

31

12.1

1

0.4

119.8

Virginia,
Western

195

115

59.0

75

38.5

4

2.1

1

0.5

103.5

Kentucky,
Eastern

273

161

59.0

103

37.7

8

2.9

1

0.4

55.3

Washington,
Western

175

86

49.1

66

37.7

22

12.6

1

0.6

60.9

North Carolina,
Eastern

183

111

60.7

69

37.7

3

1.6

0

0.0

155.5

Florida, Middle

697

398

57.1

260

37.3

38

5.5

1

0.1

94.6

Tennessee,
Western

188

111

59.0

69

36.7

7

3.7

1

0.5

98.4

Texas, Northern

268

162

60.4

98

36.6

8

3.0

0

0.0

97.6

Missouri, Eastern

327

195

59.6

119

36.4

13

4.0

0

0.0

73.6

New Hampshire

56

28

50.0

20

35.7

7

12.5

1

1.8

58.2

Wisconsin,
Eastern

67

44

65.7

23

34.3

0

0.0

0

0.0

121.5

109

59

54.1

37

33.9

12

11.0

1

0.9

92.9

Oregon

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002

41

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 8

[Vol. 47: p. 921

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

Massachusetts

227

Pennsylvania,
Western

104

45.8

77

33.9

45

19.8

1

0.4

64.2

124

70 56.5

42

33.9

12

9.7

0

0.0

86.3

NewJersey

230

141

61.3

73

31.7

16

7.0

0

0.0

73.4

District of
Columbia

117

Indiana,
Northern

56

47.9

37

31.6

24

20.5

0

0.0

81.3

139

89

64.0

43

30.9

6

4.3

1

0.7

92.6

Kansas

179

105 58.7

55

30.7

19

10.6

0

0.0

85.3

Mississippi,
Northern

62

37

59.7

19

30.6

6

9.7

0

0.0

97.4

Vermont

79

36 45.6

24

30.4

19

24.1

0

0.0

51.8

Georgia,
Southern

56

36 64.3

17

30.4

3

5.4

0

0.0

126.9

Minnesota

206

55.3

59

28.6

33 16.0

0

0.0

79.5

Tennessee,
Middle

44

30 68.2

12

27.3

2

4.5

0

0.0

96.9

31

12.7

2

0.8

101.2

Georgia,
Northern
Alaska

114

245

148

60.4

64

26.1

69

44

63.8

18

26.1

7 10.1

0

0.0

78.5

297 43.2

172

25.0

216 31.4

3

0.4

53.8

New York,
Eastern

688

Oklahoma,
Western

64

46

71.9

16

25.0

1

1.6

1

1.6

124.9

1,694

1,152

68.0

415

24.5

123

7.3

4

0.2

58.3

138

86 62.3

33

23.9

18

13.0

1

0.7

78.8

Texas, Southern
Hawaii
Oklahoma,
Northern

51

35 68.6

12

23.5

3

5.9

1

2.0

146.1

New York,
Southern

540

351 65.0

124

23.0

61

11.3

4

0.7

80.8

California,
Eastern

137

89 65.0

31

22.6

17

12.4

0

0.0

107.9

31

18 58.1

7

22.6

6

19.4

0

0.0

90.9

75.2

30

21.9

3

2.2

1

0.7

139.9

North Dakota
North Carolina,
Middle

137

103

South Dakota

60

39 65.0

13

21.7

8

13.3

0

0.0

69.3

Arkansas,
Western

57

44

77.2

12

21.1

1

1.8

0

0.0

74.8

California,
Central

137

91

66.4

28

20.4

16

11.7

0

0.0

98.4
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Louisiana,

Eastern

162

120

74.1

33

20.4

9

5.6

0

0.0

98.2

Kentucky,
Western

81

62 76.5

16

19.8

3

3.7

0

0.0

89.7

Nebraska

318

227 71.4

61

19.2

30

9.4

0

0.0

85.6

Florida,
Southern

1,068

820 76.8

200

18.7

47

4.4

1

0.1

92.5

45

35 77.8

8

17.8

2

4.4

0

0.0

99.7

Nevada

102

65 63.7

17

16.7

20

19.6

0

0.0

81.4

Texas, Eastern

264

201

76.1

43

16.3

20

7.6

0

0.0

89.0

Arkansas,
Eastern

78

62

79.5

12

15.4

4

5.1

0

0.0

105.7

Virgin Islands

20

13

65.0

3

15.0

4

20.0

0

0.0

54.4

290 18.0

235

14.6

1,081

67.2

2

0.1

28.2

81.8

19

14.4

5

3.8

0

0.0

100.1

Wisconsin,
Western

California,
Southern

1,608

West Virginia,
Southern

132

California,
Northern

129

74 57.4

18

14.0

35 27.1

2

1.6

74.7

Connecticut

73

33 45.2

10

13.7

30 41.1

0

0.0

103.1

Utah

69

42 60.9

9

13.0

18

26.1

0

0.0

60.0

72.8

283

13.0

309

14.2

1

0.0

38.4

Texas, Western

2,182

108

1,589

Rhode Island

62

43 69.4

8

12.9

11

17.7

0

0.0

75.4

New Mexico

586

427 72.9

72

12.3

87

14.8

0

0.0

39.4

Arizona

866

247 28.5

104

12.0

514 59.4

1

0.1

28.6

69

45 65.2

8

11.6

16 23.2

0

0.0

55.1

Washington,
Eastern
West Virginia,
Northern

115

101

87.8

13

11.3

1

0.9

0

0.0

81.5

Virginia, Eastern

415

359 86.5

40

9.6

15

3.6

1

0.2

135.0

Puerto Rico

325

289 88.9

24

7.4

11

3.4

1

0.3

79.5

Illinois,
Southern

244

227 93.0

9

3.7

6

2.5

2

0.8

122.4

0

0.0

9

50.0

0

0.0

148.8

Oklahoma,
Eastern

18

9

50.0
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